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Thailand's political crisis has reached a new juncture. On Dec. 8 Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra called for the dissolution of parliament and new elections to be held in February 2014 after the opposition Democrat Party resigned from parliament and mass protests surged in the opposition stronghold of Bangkok.
Changes in the country's regionally inflected social and economic status are driving demands for greater political representation and budgetary support from about half the population, mostly in the north and northeast. This populist movement, represented by the ruling Pheu Thai party and the Shinawatra family, continues to face opposition from the established power in Bangkok, generating a constitutional crisis amid an impending royal succession.
Elections are presumed to return the ruling Pheu Thai party to power, though nothing is certain. Yingluck and the Pheu Thai party have lost some popularity in recent months after setbacks, which included failed constitutional amendments and resistance to a controversial political amnesty bill that would have brought Yingluck's brother Thaksin, the former prime minister and a lightning rod in Thai politics, back into the country. But in all likelihood the loss in popular support is not enough to bring the opposition Democrats back into power directly. Pro-Thaksin parties in various incarnations have won the last four general elections, while the Democrats have not won a majority for themselves since the early 1990s, although they ruled from 2008 to 2011 with a parliamentary coalition. Yingluck is clearly expecting a renewed mandate for Pheu Thai after the dissolution, a tactic her brother used before her when challenged by opponents.
Even if Pheu Thai has the raw votes, there is room for all kinds of interference between now and the formation of a new government. The opposition has repeatedly shown in the past several months that it intends to keep trying -- after each setback for the ruling party, the opposition has increased the pressure. Already the current protest leader, Suthep Thaugsuban, claims that new elections are insufficient and that he will keep the pressure on the Pheu Thai caretaker government. A range of other factors could also complicate Pheu Thai's expectation of a quick return to power on the back of popular support. Behind-the-scenes military pressure on different politicians led to the formation of a Democrat-led coalition in December 2008. Other institutions, such as the Election Commission or the Constitutional Court, could also hamper Pheu Thai. Therefore, Pheu Thai's resort to new elections is not foolproof.
Should Pheu Thai win elections, a new popular mandate for the pro-Thaksin camp would enable it to push forward its legislative and constitutional goals, intended to remove institutional checks on Pheu Thai's electoral advantage. There are a range of adjustments Pheu Thai can make to try to weaken the institutions that hinder it, including reshaping the Senate to be fully elected and to include a wider range of candidates. It can also draft a new amnesty bill that is less sweeping and therefore more likely to pass, although the opposition will surge to try to prevent amnesty for Thaksin himself.
Yet when Yingluck's Pheu Thai came to power in 2011, it managed to focus on its domestic economic agenda and kept the country relatively stable for two years, following the bloody protests and political showdown of 2010. Pheu Thai may make a similar decision, depending on how the elections go, to delay the controversial amnesty or constitutional changes and focus on handling the 2.2 trillion-baht ($68 billion) stimulus package and broadening the base of support with subsidies for farmers and families. However, if Pheu Thai pushes amnesty and charter change, then it will face a replay of the opposition surge against these changes.
The Democrats and anti-Thaksin groups have achieved something in this latest round of contest: They have delayed the amnesty bill and constitutional amendments, shown that Yingluck's government is vulnerable and postponed Pheu Thai's overall agenda. It is possible that they may make some gains in the parliament to help them hinder the government's plans. It is even conceivable that through military pressure they could rise to power. However, a new ruling majority for Pheu Thai would again expose them as a minority incapable of winning broad national support, leading them to return to planning their next round of obstruction. They have bought some time, but for actual power they will continually have to fall back on the bureaucracy, courts, Senate, palace and military.
Thus Thailand likely faces more protests and political upheaval before the February elections. Even if the opposition attempts to reduce its street activity and refocus on elections, the underlying social, economic and constitutional crisis will continue afterward. In looking toward an endgame, eventually the Bangkok political establishment will have to come to a new settlement that recognizes the popular power and economic expectations of the political forces based in the north and northeast. The king's impending death symbolizes the fading of the Cold War generation, but that does not mean that the bureaucratic, military and royal pillars of the old regime will necessarily collapse.
There may be room for a grand compromise in which the repeated election of pro-Thaksin parties results in incremental change, and the establishment makes more room to accommodate the pro-Thaksin movement (if not Thaksin himself). The greatest short-term danger to such a settlement would be the installation of another unelected government, whether as a result of military interference like in 2008 or a military coup like in 2006, but the military is aware of this danger to its interests and therefore will keep refusing to interpose until it deems intervention less harmful to its interests than continued neutrality. Thailand's regional and economic divisions do not necessarily portend revolution, but they continue to intensify, and genuine national reconciliation is a long way off.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)