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The Afghan President, Hamid Karzai has refused to sign the US-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement (BSA). The agreement, comprising 30 documents and 36 articles covers everything from taxation and customs duties to a promise to protect Afghanistan from hostile action and will form the basis of the US military presence in Afghanistan post-2014.
Karzai, in the last few months has gone past a few US deadlines to sign the BSA; the latest one being 31 December 2013. He has ignored US threats of the “zero option” and recommendation of his own Loya Jirga and its head and his ally, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. He wants the BSA to be signed by the next Afghan president after the elections in April this year subject to US refrain from raiding civilian homes in Afghanistan and directly negotiating with the Afghan Taliban.
Karzai’s stand has confounded analysts and even frustrated the US lawmakers, who at a congressional hearing in December last year accused him of “insulting” US sacrifices by not signing the “all for Afghans and Afghanistan” BSA . The US also got people from the Iraqi foreign minister to Jan Kubis, the U.N. special representative to Afghanistan, to “advise” Karzai to sign the BSA. Even the most unlikely of mediators, the Indian Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh, during her recent visit to the US found herself being urged by the Obama administration to use Indian influence with Karzai on the BSA.[1] The absence of a credible reason for Karzai’s dilly-dallying on the BSA has led to slew of theories.
Shah Shuja Complex
Some analysts feel it is all about Karzai’s legacy as he dreads his situation being compared to the treatment meted out to his forebear, Shah Shuja, by the East India Company in the 1840s and be remembered as a puppet ruler.[2] Shah Shuja incidentally came from the same sub-tribe as Karzai. There are others who feel Karzai has the mindset of a tribal warlord, playing community and local politics at the national level, resorting to brinkmanship and in the process losing sight of the big picture. Not surprising then that some members of the Meshrano Jirga - or the upper house of parliament, last month asked Karzai to ink the BSA with the US instead of seeking defence cooperation from India.[3] However, as per William Dalrymple, the Afghan President “is no fool", and is vastly underrated by the West.
Cut-off Date
After weeks of insisting that the BSA be signed by the end of the year, US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel now says that Karzai has time until February’s NATO defence ministers meeting, [4] backing off his initial demand that the deal be done by the end of 2013. However Omar Samad, former Afghan ambassador to France and now with the New America Foundation, feels it is more to do with Afghan elections.
Afghan Elections
According to Samad the February cut-off is derived from the understanding that Afghan presidential candidates (and Karzai) would not want BSA to be a campaigning issue and hence would like to settle it before the start of the campaigning season ie by the end of February 2014. The US also does not want to wait until April’s presidential election because of the possibility of a lengthy runoff that may follow in case the elections do not yield a clear winner. This would delay the signing of the BSA into the summer, perhaps even the fall of 2014. Adding to this is the talked about possibility of an extended winter pushing the election date itself ahead of the scheduled April 2014.
Operational Issues
Hagel’s other worry is that the longer the BSA is delayed, more it will affect the confidence of the Afghan people and the ANSF going forward post-2014. It would also directly affect US planning and its support for its ISAF partners. The US military feels it needs adequate time to plan and prepare for the complex post-2014 mission including numbers of troops, locations, budgets, and the Congress approval. Requirements of multi-national partners (ISAF) for the mission add to its complexity and the signing of the BSA is after all just the first step of this process.
Strategic Considerations
US Congressman Rohrabacher recently remarked on the BSA, “I think we are grovelling again... This is insanity and it’s time for us to get our butts out of that country, not for their sake, but for our sake.” That represents a significant view in the US on Afghanistan. However, the official US narrative is that “an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure has been made in Afghanistan since 9/11 and important gains have been achieved to make Afghanistan a better place."[5] Also, “Afghanistan is a key ally in the region and like in Iraq, U.S. military officials want to give the deal every chance to succeed before packing up and going home.”
A CFR special report specifies two main missions for the remaining U.S. troops; “majority should be assigned to train, advise, and assist ANSF. Smaller numbers of troops should be tasked specifically with conducting strikes against terrorists by killing or capturing high-value targets, working with high-end Afghan forces in Taliban-controlled areas, and using unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and occasional strike missions.”
Karzai has a different understanding of the situation and seems convinced that the US needs the BSA for its own strategic objectives, including for launching counterterrorist operations in Pakistan. [7] He therefore feels he is negotiating from a position of strength, which may not be very far from the truth. Afghanistan is virtually the last remaining US “outpost” in the region and BSA will secure it for next ten years. Further, Shah Shuja complex notwithstanding, Karzai has managed to dent the US narrative on Afghanistan. It has made US and NATO revisit the fact that they are in Afghanistan for their own needs and ends and in doing so Karzai has accorded parity, albeit temporarily, to Afghan sacrifices with US “ blood and treasure” in Afghanistan.
The delay in signing of the BSA has also provided Karzai a measure of support which he (or his candidate in the Presidential race) would have if the BSA was signed. Lastly, he has managed to hold the door open for negotiations with the Taliban- which still has not climbed down from its position of “no foreign soldier on Afghan soil.” The Taliban has an time window to evaluate the pros and cons of its position on a negotiated settlement because the situation will be dramatically altered once the BSA is signed.
Conclusion
The BSA has an important political dimension, when signed it not only commits the US to ensuring security but also managing the politics in Kabul. It will need to make certain that the government of the day in Kabul stays committed to the BSA and does not create a situation by abrogating the pact in favour of another alternative. Further, it puts the Taliban out in the cold (in its Pakistani haven) and consigns Afghanistan to an unending state of insurgency. Karzai therefore has good reasons for taking his time on the BSA.
By Special Arrangement with The Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (http://www.claws.in)