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Watershed 1967 derives its title from the watershed principle of defining the boundary from the highest line of mountains, which separates rivers flowing on either side. Since the international border was un-demarcated, this principle was seen as the most logical way of defining boundaries at the Nathu La and Cho La Mountain passes by then General Officer Commanding (GOC) Maj. Gen. Sagat Singh.
The Nathu La mountain pass is situated between Yadong County in Tibet and Sikkim while the Cho La mountain pass is situated northwest of Nathu La and connects Sikkim with Tibet. The Nathu La and Cho La clashes, often referred to as the Sino-Indian War of 1967 occurred in order to take control of the disputed borderland in the Chumbi Valley. Divided into three sections with multiple chapters within, the book chronologically describes the turn of events that led to the 1965 war with Pakistan, the Battle of Nathu La in 1967, and the aftermath in Cho La.
Jelep La, Nathu La, and Cho La takes the centre stage in this book. While the initial plan in 1965 was to retreat from both Jelep La and Nathu La in case of a Chinese ground offensive, it was the strategic foresight and knowledge of the terrain that made then Maj. Gen. Sagat Singh, GOC, 17 Mountain Division, defy orders from his superiors and not vacate the region. The value of this decision becomes clearer when we consider an alternative scenario. If the Nathu La had been occupied by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1967, it could have cost India its access to the Northeast. It could have been further used by the PLA for launching ground offenses deep into Indian territory. This security dilemma has always existed in the Siliguri Corridor region, popularly known as the Chicken's Neck given its vulnerability.
Watershed 1967 comes off as an addition to the existing knowledge base around India-China military affairs. What sets the books apart is that besides honouring the valour of the Indian Army, the author, through his academic rigour, provides insights from the strategic level to contextualize what motives and planning led to the events of 1965 and 1967. Author Probal Dasgupta during his stint in the Indian Army was a company commander in the 5th Battalion of the 11 Gorkha Rifles commonly referred to as 5/11 Gorkha Rifles (GR) which is the same unit that arrived in Sikkim to establish the Cho La post. Upon retiring, he made a transition into academic life as a Braun-Meyer fellow and Tata Scholar at Columbia University studying International Affairs.
The book serves the varied audience that the author's profile attracts. In instances of death-defying acts of valour by young Indian officers and men, the exceptional leadership and foresight among staff officers and corps commanders, we see India lacking political will during the 1962 war. However, this was compensated with the exceptional mettle of later political leaders like Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi. The book reveals that both these leaders had a similar mindset when it came to military decisions during times of war.
The author brings out an unknown facet in history where Chinese premier Zhou Enlai's suggestion to General Ayub Khan to prepare for a long war with India in 1965 was overlooked by Khan and cost him the war. This goes to show the extent to which the Chinese leaders understood the region. The book also puts a great deal of focus on Sikkim highlighting Gen. Sagat Singh’s relationship with the Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal, and his wife Hope Cooke, and gives a detailed account of how the events around the merger unfolded.
The Battle of Nathu La comes off as a monumental moment in Indian history that went unnoticed. If the Chinese were able to capture the Siliguri Corridor, the PLA would have cut off the Northeast by linking up with East Pakistan. The author argues that this could have cost India a major setback in the 1971 war. While it remains counterfactual to say how the events would have turned out, we now know that Pakistan and China did not have mere convergence of interests but a joint plan to dismember the border states of India. Hence, a threat of a two-front war has always persisted for India.
The author then draws attention to the aftermath battle at Cho La. When a final push was made by the PLA at the northern border, a fierce response was delivered from the Indian side. The lives lost at Cho La from both sides were enormous. In this sense, the author points out that despite skirmishes at the border, the two countries have not gone to war ever since. This is because the Indian Army was able to scale up its psychological ascendency over China in these two battles.
The author asserts that the decision-making on the ground by commanders and staff officers was the reason for our victory and those operational and tactical decisions should be rested with the armed forces only. However, the author also writes against any military misadventure and that all military operations should be subordinate to political decisions.
As China progresses with its global ambitions, India's engagement with its hostile neighbour gets more complex in nature. Whether this engagement would bear more hostilities or pragmatic diplomatic negotiations which are acceptable to both sides only depends on how the current situation progresses. In this regard, it is important to understand the thought processes that drive Chinese foreign policy. This imperative makes the need for young Indians to be aware of the overlooked facts and forgotten instances that occurred in our past engagements with China. China cares a great deal about what is written and read about the country overseas. For instance, the book points out that Zhou Enlai gifted a book by Neville Maxwell about India’s defeat by China to Dr. Henry Kissinger. This forms part of overall Chinese psychological tactics to gain psychological ascendency over states. In this sense, the book does an outstanding job of telling India’s story.
Tensions at India’s northern border continue to influence the Indo-China bilateral ties to this day. Opinions regarding rivalry with China also remain divided. While the two countries maintain a robust trade-based relationship and cooperate on different multilateral frameworks, the situation at the border remains unresolved. Hence, even though it is recognized that normalisation of relations will be beneficial to both countries, skepticism towards China persists. In this regard, the young generation of Indians will have to navigate this complicated relationship, and as China has remembered its victory of 1962, the next generation in India should remember and tell the story of Watershed 1967, India’s forgotten victory over China.