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Colombo Security Conclave: Multilateralism in Indian Ocean Region.
Shourya Gori
SSIS Batch 2022-24
30 September 2022
Oceans have always been spaces of competition between dominant powers of the time. The Influence of Sea Power on History, by Alfred Mahan, considered to be the bible for naval strategists, gives a very securitized view of oceans.
The unique geographical, political, and economic dynamics of the Indian Ocean make a case for developing a security nexus that caters to the needs of small and developing island nations, which are at the center of emerging power politics. The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) is an initiative by littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for combating non-traditional security issues.
A minilateral in making
India has been the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, and this has time and again been proven by the different roles taken up by the Indian security forces in the region. From establishing political and economic stability to undertaking Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions and fighting terrorism, India has been at the heart of security in the IOR.
On these lines, what started as the National Security Adviser Level Meeting on Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation in 2011 between India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives has been revived and renamed the Colombo Security Conclave in 2020. The minilateral spearheaded by India has outlined five main pillars: maritime safety and security, counterterrorism and radicalization, combating trafficking and transnational organized crime, cyber security & protection of critical infrastructure and technology, and HADR.
The 5th NSA level meeting held in Maldives saw the expansion of the Conclave to include Mauritius as a full member, while Seychelles and Bangladesh still remain observer states. Agreement to form a roadmap for cooperation, the willingness of the member states to meet regularly, and the expansion of membership indicate institutionalization. The importance of securing sea lanes of communications (SLOC), seen from the maiden CSC Focused Operation conducted in November 2021 by the naval forces of India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives, is a testimony to the synergy between member states.
The case for cooperation and collaboration further increases because of the already existing mechanism of the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), wherein the member states are partner nations. In addition, the member states are also participants in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. All three member states are recipients of Indian aid assistance in the economic and defense sectors.
Indian interest
This development comes at a time when China's PLA Navy has become the most significant naval force and is venturing into the Indian Ocean more often than ever. Thus, the significance of the grouping increases, as the Arabian Sea has always been a contested water body due to the sizable naval presence of Indian, Pakistani, and even American forces present at Diego Garcia and the stationing of the 5th fleet at Bahrain.
India has traditionally played the role of a stabilizing force in the region, as it has been the first responder during any type of crisis. These characteristics have led to former Indian PM Manmohan Singh terming India the 'net security provider' in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). While India still remains the dominant force in the region, its willingness to intervene in domestic affairs of the IOR littoral affairs has diminished due to the negative 'Big Brother' image being peddled. Instead, New Delhi wants to establish itself as the region's 'preferred security partner'. Working on the five pillars will indeed account for confidence building in Maldives and Sri Lanka because of the 'India Out' campaign in Maldives and the strong opposition to Indian investments in the West Container Terminal of Colombo port. The nomenclature of 'preferred' rather than 'net' also provides the island nations the option of an alternative security provider, giving them the agency to choose their partners, yet again showing the Indian commitment to non-interference and refraining from any kind of coercion.
Misses & Weakness
The non-traditional security aspect fits well in the current security dispensary but fails to ignore the climate-induced security threat in the region. Maldives and Mauritius are small island nations vulnerable to climate change, which is an existential threat to both member states. Further, the issue of refugees arriving through sea routes wasn't mentioned in the joint press release. This remains very much central to the security of Bangladesh, as it hosts Rohingya refugees. Even Indian concerns about refugees traveling through sea routes become crucial, as Sri Lanka is in economic turmoil.
A more collaborative and concrete mechanism must be in place to tackle issues related to marine biodiversity, which is core to sea communities and their livelihood. The human security aspect linked to the marine ecosystem should also be considered to tackle oil spills and hold stakeholders accountable.
While the CSC highlights the role played in non-traditional security threats, the difference in the perceived traditional security threats can derail cooperation. The docking of the Chinese surveillance ship Yuan Wang 5 at Hambantota port, despite Indian reservations, shows the inherent difference in the security perception of states.
The CSC shouldn't be made a pawn of the larger geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and should be limited to the regional space of IOR. Any attempts to make it an exclusive group could hamper India's credibility in the region and meet a fate like that of a non-functional SAARC.
References
Vignesh, R. (2022, March 1), Colombo Security Conclave: Prospects for India as 'Preferred Security Partner', from Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis website : https://idsa.in/idsacomments/colombo-security-conclave-r-vignesh-300322
Rajgopalan, Rajeshwari, (2021, August 19), Colombo Security Conclave: A New Minilateral for the Indian Ocean?, from The Diplomat, website : https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/colombo-security-conclave-a-new-minilateral-for-the-indian-ocean/
The President's Office, Republic of Maldives, (2022, July 7), Colombo Security Conclave-Joint Press Release, website :: https://presidency.gov.mv/Press/Article/26907
Ministry of Defense, (2021, November 28) Colombo Security Conclave Focused Operation between India, Maldives and Sri Lanka, by PIB Delhi, website: https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1775797
Palanisamy, Balchander, (2022, March 20), How the Colombo Security Conclave Can Avoid SAARC's Fate, from The Diplomat, website :https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/how-the-colombo-security-conclave-can-avoid-saarcs-fate/
Zongyi, Liu, (2021, August 19), India eyes bigger influence in Indian Ocean through Colombo Security Conclave, from Global Times, website : https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231954.shtml
World News, Press Trust of India, (2022, August 22), Chinese Ship That Docked At Sri Lanka Port, Leaves After 6 Days, from NDTV, website : https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/chinese-spy-ship-yuan-wang-5-that-docked-at-sri-lankas-hambantota-port-leaves-after-6-days-report-3275851