.png)
.jpg)
If acted on, a statement by Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga that Japan could station public officials on the disputed islands known as the Senkakus in Japan and the Diaoyu in China would mark an escalation in the longstanding territorial dispute between the two countries. It would also mean Japan believes it can handle China's reaction, which could well be strong.
The idea of stationing public officials on the island is not new. Japan has controlled the islands since the United States handed them over along with Okinawa in 1972, but after that time they were held privately by the Kurihara family. In 2012 Tokyo's nationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara, sought to have Tokyo purchase the islands from their owner and said he would have facilities and workers stationed there. The plan caused a sharp reaction from the Chinese public and government, and threatened to escalate the diplomatic row over the island's status. Then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda oversaw a solution of sorts by having the Japanese central government "nationalize," or purchase, the islands, which would theoretically maintain the status quo and avoid a scenario where a firebrand politician like Ishihara could take provocative actions that would disrupt Sino-Japanese relations.
During elections late in 2012, however, the Liberal Democratic Party proposed in a campaign paper that it could station public workers on the islands. The party was motivated by fears of the surging popularity of Ishihara and the Japan Restoration Party on the right. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, at that time running for office, downplayed the idea to demonstrate a more moderate foreign policy stance in the election, but the option remained on the table.
Over the past year, Abe and the Liberal Democrats have consolidated their political position at home. They now control both houses of the Diet and have broad public support. Aside from his well-known economic revitalization plan, Abe's party has an ambitious agenda to speed up Japan's ongoing military normalization. This includes revising defense guidelines, increasing military spending, and making legal (if not constitutional) adjustments to enable Japan's Self-Defense Forces to engage in collective self-defense and widen their range of activities.
Not surprisingly, China has played a large part in the renewed impetus behind military normalization. China's rising naval capability and territorial assertiveness have caused the Japanese national security establishment to rethink its strategy and defense priorities, with more attention devoted to territorial sovereignty, waters, islands and subsea resources. Notably, the Japanese have sought to increase their amphibious military capability and conduct exercises to practice taking and retaking islands, as they did with the United States in June.
From China's point of view, the Diaoyu islands traditionally belonged to China and the Japanese only gained control as a result of their aggression during World War II -- for which they have not made amends -- and as a result of their alliance since that time with the United States. In recent years, China has increased its maritime activity around the islands to assert its claims. The issue has become increasingly the object of nationalist feeling in China, both in policymaking circles and, in part as a result of propaganda, in the general public. The Chinese had hoped that Japan would not go beyond formal nationalization of the islands to the point of building new structures or putting people there, since those actions would undermine China's claims. Now, with Suga's statement, those hopes seem futile.
Clearly Japan believes that China's increasing tempo of maritime activity around the islands reveals Beijing's intent to assert its territorial claims more aggressively as it has already done in the South China Sea, hence Tokyo's efforts to pre-empt China in the Senkakus via concrete actions to shore up Japanese sovereignty claims. For its part, China believes that any Japanese construction or permanent stationing of people on the island would represent a provocative encroachment, something it wants to prevent. Already, with Chinese and Japanese ships and now aircraft constantly running through the island chain, the two sides risk collisions or clashes that could spiral out of control as a result of political emotions on both sides.
If Japan seeks to change the disposition of public personnel or facilities on the island -- and it is by no means clear yet that Abe will follow through on this proposal -- then it has calculated that it is no longer in its interest to be as accommodating as it has been toward China with regard to the islands. It also means Tokyo has decided it is capable of weathering China's reaction, whether it should come in the form of trade sanctions or an even more active demonstrations of maritime power. Such a shift would also complicate Japanese relations with the United States, which attempts to moderate the stances of both countries and would not like to have its security commitment to Japan put to the test as a result of precipitous actions or reactions by either Tokyo or Beijing.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)