.png)
.jpg)
Chinese President Xi Jinping's first official overseas visit has taken him to Russia, Tanzania, the Republic of Congo and South Africa. First visits by newly inaugurated presidents are often filled with symbolism, and Xi’s has been no different. The visit to Moscow highlights the long-standing relationship between China and Russia, but it also shows Beijing reinforcing its role as one of many powers, not as a country that sees world affairs as pivoting around itself and the United States. Xi's visit to Africa reflects China's continued campaign to position itself as a friend to and the voice of the developing world. Both visits, however, also highlight a critical issue for Beijing: the need to secure access to energy and primary commodities.
Xi's Russia visit reciprocates Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing following Putin's most recent inauguration. (Former Chinese president Hu Jintao’s first official visit was also to Russia.) The Moscow visit focused on arms and energy. Among the deals announced around or during Xi's stay in Moscow were the Chinese purchase of 24 Su-35 multi-role fighters, four Lada/Amur-class diesel-electric submarines, and military and technological cooperation on transport and aerial fueling aircraft, 117S engines (used in the Su-35) and anti-air missile systems.
This military component serves to assist Russia’s arms industry. Chinese purchases from Russia have in general declined over the last decade as Beijing has focused on developing indigenous technologies. Beijing sees the Su-35 as giving the Chinese more advanced capabilities until they develop their own next generation fighters, the J-20 and J-31 stealth aircraft. The decision to buy the Su-35 and the potential agreement for joint development of the 117S engines may also reflect the limitations of China’s indigenous aircraft development. Despite China’s carefully choreographed "leaks" surrounding its stealth fighter developments, it seems Beijing’s capabilities remain constrained. The submarine deal, which includes construction of two of the export variant of the Lada in China, is another example of technology transfer, again highlighting China’s continued need for foreign designs and systems to continue its own domestic development programs.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Russian visit has been China's recognition that it needs to maintain security along its northern and western borders. China faces potentially challenging situations with Myanmar and North Korea and is currently focusing its regional security attention on its maritime borders, where Beijing has disputes with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam. Keeping Russian relations in check allows Beijing to keep its attention focused east and south and sends a signal that Beijing is secure along a large portion of its land borders. The land borders with Russia also represent an important pathway for Chinese energy needs -- a pathway largely immune to any potential U.S. maritime interdiction.
Xi's visit also saw a spate of new or expanded energy deals with Russia, including a substantial increase in oil imports, Chinese participation in Russian energy operations in the Arctic and in the Barents Sea, large Chinese loans to Russian energy firms and the completion of the long-delayed Russian natural gas pipeline to China. This comes as Moscow is heavily focused on extending energy ties away from its traditional European markets toward energy-hungry Asia.
Energy and commodities played a large part in Xi’s visit to Africa as well. In Tanzania, the focus is on Chinese investment in the Bagamoyo port project, which will also include a special industrial zone. Tanzania is China’s chosen East African trading center, and the port development follows a steady expansion of Chinese port agreements stretching from Myanmar and Bangladesh through Sri Lanka and Pakistan and now to Tanzania. Although much has been made of Chinese port projects as a “string of pearls” strategy to create overseas naval bases and “surround” India, the main purpose for China is to maintain control over all aspects of its overseas supply chains. China’s general strategy is to buy resource projects such as mines, staff them largely with Chinese workers, move the goods on Chinese-built roads or rail lines in Chinese-built vehicles to Chinese-built or -invested ports to load onto Chinese ships for transport to China. Tanzania is the next link in the expanding chain of such ports.
In Africa, Xi is also seeking to alter the perception that China as just another imperialist power exploiting the continent for its labor and resources. The basic Chinese investment strategy has drawn increasing criticism. Local groups have protested and even attacked Chinese facilities, and local media and governments have begun debating the costs and benefits of Chinese investment. To preserve its access to commodities and potential new markets, Xi is seeking to reassure Africa that Chinese investment remains friendly and beneficial.
Resources, supply routes and maritime security have been at the center of Xi’s first trip, revealing the concerns facing China's leadership abroad today. China’s economic growth, even if it is slowing, still consumes vast amounts of imported raw materials and energy. Long gone are the days when China could be self-sufficient, and even its agriculture is reaching the limits of supplying food to its vast population. This presents a strategic dilemma for Beijing, which must keep China's economy active and growing in order to maintain domestic social stability and to provide work, income and materials to China’s citizens.
The economic activity has made China ever more dependent on overseas-sourced raw materials as well as markets. This has forced China to shift its international relations and its defense posture to one focused on the seas, rather than one focused on the land. Yet China remains largely a land power, its greatest security threat arising from within, and from longstanding challenges along its borders. Securing the resources and markets necessary to maintain the level of economic activity needed to keep the people stable and satisfied requires reaching ever farther abroad, stretching China’s ability to maintain control and security over its resources. The farther China must go abroad -- and the more it seeks to secure its supply lines -- the more it runs afoul of the interests of powers such as Japan, India and the United States, which see Chinese actions as aggressive. This forces China to spend even more money, resources and political capital to defend its interests.
The symbolism in Xi’s visits to Russia and Africa may have been intended to showcase China’s role as a regional power, as a close friend of Russia, and as a friend to Africa and the developing world. What it revealed, however, was China's steadily expanding sphere of interests and the limitations of Beijing’s ability to manage them.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)