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North Korea's decision to move some of its medium- and long-range ballistic missile systems corresponds with the country's strategy of shaping and dominating the psychological battlefield. South Korean media has reported April 4 that Pyongyang was relocating the missiles, though accounts differ as to whether Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles or the KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missiles were the missiles in question. Neither missile system has been tested, but it is their mobility, rather than their proven effectiveness, that worries U.S. and South Korean observers. Their mobility could enable North Korea to launch a surprise attack -- something nearly impossible to achieve at its stationary satellite launch sites.
For several weeks now, South Korean officials have reported movement of North Korean road-mobile missiles. The most recent reports suggest Pyongyang is positioning them on the east coast, possibly to launch them around April 15 to commemorate North Korean founder Kim Il Sung's birthday.
Pyongyang has steadily escalated its rhetoric since February, when it completed another nuclear test. It has augmented that rhetoric with small-scale physical actions, such as increased flight training and coastal landing exercises, noticeable activity at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor site, halted entry into the Kaesong joint development area and now the movement of road-mobile missile systems. Indeed, North Korea often exploits satellite and reconnaissance activity around the Korean Peninsula to display movement and activity deliberately.
It is unclear which missile systems Pyongyang is supposedly moving. Some rumors from Seoul and Tokyo suggest the missiles may be the KN-08 (labeled Hwasong-13 by North Korea), first revealed at a military parade April 15, 2012. The KN-08 is a road-mobile three-stage missile with an estimated range of 10,000 kilometers (6,213 miles). Large eight-axle vehicles are required to transport the missiles. What was displayed at the parade was believed to be a mock-up, but that does not preclude the existence of the KN-08. North Korea displayed a mock-up of the Taepodong-1 ballistic missile in 1994 -- just four years before it launched a real Taepodong-1. The United States is taking the development of the KN-08 seriously and has already moved to increase its Ground-based Midcourse Defense array accordingly.
Other South Korean reports suggest that the missiles are Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles, another road-mobile system that has an estimated range of about 4,000 kilometers. First displayed in October 2010, the Musudan is based largely on Soviet-era SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile technology. And like the KN-08, this system is untested, and the missile on display was believed to be a mock-up of the missiles it represented. Reports from 2007 suggested that North Korea had tested a Musudan missile in Iran, but these were unconfirmed -- as were rumors that the missile was displayed at a parade in Pyongyang the same year.
Rethinking Strategies
The significance of the missile systems is two-fold. If tested successfully, they prove that North Korea is capable of launching longer-range missiles from mobile units. North Korea's long-range missiles are currently launched from one of two sites, which are designed for the Taepodong/Unha missile/satellite launch vehicle, and take days to set up and fuel before flight. Pyongyang cannot launch a surprise attack from these sites (though it skillfully played observers during its December 2012 launch).
In previous long-range missile tests, North Korea tested its ballistic missiles from fixed sites, which the United States and its allies were better able to detect and monitor. With a road-mobile weapon like the KN-08, the United States and its allies will have a much harder time locating the launch site, the launch time and the direction of the missile's trajectory. This in turn requires the deployment of significant ballistic missile defense equipment to cover all the potential North Korean missile trajectories.
But more immediately, the systems enable North Korea to shape the perceptions of those involved in peninsular affairs. The United States is already taking physical steps in anticipation of a launch, reinforcing its 7th Fleet ballistic missile defense-capable destroyers and other defenses already in theater with out-of-theater assets, such as the San Diego-based USS Decatur Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer and reportedly the floating, self-propelled, mobile X-band radar station, known as SBX-1.
For North Korea, the current rise in tensions is not a drive to war -- Pyongyang does not believe it could win such a war -- but rather a drive to create political tensions in and between Seoul, Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow and others. The threat of miscalculation or an accident grows as the level of tension grows. Even if the other countries do not see North Korea as seriously pursuing a war, they must step up their own precautions and rules of engagement as precautionary measures.
Pyongyang has accomplished one step in shaping the psychology of the region: shifting the attention of the other players to taking steps to prevent South Korea from accidentally or intentionally launching a pre-emptive attack on North Korea. Once the United States and China see this as a real possibility or uncertainty, allowing North Korea to continue its rhetorical challenge unchecked begins to seem less optimal. Washington believes North Korea is unwilling to go so far as to launch an attack beyond small skirmishes, but it is the escalation cycle from the South Korean response that now seems less predictable. This may encourage the United States and others to rethink their strategy of ignoring Pyongyang into submission.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)