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As the Egyptian military marshals its forces against Islamist militants in the Sinai Peninsula, the situation for Hamas in the Gaza Strip is becoming increasingly precarious. In recent years, Hamas has tried to distance itself from Iran and instead rely on the political rise of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood to reinforce its own political ascent. But now, the ouster of former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and the Egyptian military's operations in the Sinai and its closure of the tunnels connecting Gaza with the outside world have forced Hamas into a corner.
Hamas has few options it can employ in response, and none of them are particularly attractive. It could try to forcibly reopen access to the tunnels that have become its economic lifeblood, as the group attempted in January 2008, or it could boost either rhetoric or militant activity against Israeli and Egyptian targets to try to remind Israel and Egypt of the consequences of blocking Gaza's borders. These options carry risks that Hamas would prefer to avoid, but if the Egyptian military continues to essentially blockade the Gaza Strip, Hamas will have to try something to change the status quo.
Not long ago, Hamas felt it was ascendant. November 2012 saw Hamas acquit itself favorably in the Pillar of Defense conflict with Israel, demonstrating an ability to strike Tel Aviv with newly acquired Fajr-5 rockets from Iran. That conflict ended with an Egypt-brokered cease-fire, under which Hamas and its Muslim Brotherhood allies in the Egyptian government negotiated a reopening of Gaza's border crossing with Egypt. In December 2012, Khaled Meshaal visited the Gaza Strip for his first trip to Palestinian territory since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, with the tacit permission of a more sympathetic administration in Cairo led by then-President Morsi.
At that point, the group felt it had developed enough regional legitimacy to distance itself from its Iranian patron and reorient itself toward Sunni regional players like Qatar and Jordan. Whether the downgrading of ties between Hamas and Tehran or Iran's own economic woes was responsible for the subsequent decline in Iranian aid to the group, Hamas was able to parlay the situation into increased political credibility in the region. In another sign of Hamas' changing statute, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has promised to visit Gaza, after having secured from the Israelis a long-sought-after public apology for the Mavi Marmara incident.
But the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt has done serious damage to Hamas' seemingly favorable position, largely because of the group's unique circumstances. Hamas has long faced challenges from other groups operating in the Gaza Strip. In June, Palestinian Islamic Jihad accused Hamas security forces of killing one of its commanders. Palestinian Islamic Jihad responded by launching rockets at Israel, hoping to provoke an Israeli response that would force Hamas to retaliate when it was hoping to avoid such actions at the time.
Shortly thereafter, in response to both Morsi's attempts to consolidate influence for the Muslim Brotherhood and major public unrest organized by the Tamarod movement, the Egyptian military removed Morsi in a military coup. While Hamas has maintained a close relationship with Egypt's military-intelligence complex for many years and predating Morsi's rise to power, the fact remains that Hamas is an ideological outgrowth of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, and at least for now Hamas appears to have lost a sympathetic ally in a neighboring state, along with the benefits that entailed.
Concurrent with its removal of Morsi, the Egyptian military deployed troops and armor to the Sinai Peninsula, both to be ready for any potential Islamist backlash against the removal of Morsi, and to contain any spillover support that could emanate from Gaza into Egypt. As early as July 1, just a day after Tamarod's major planned protests against Morsi's regimes, the Turkish news agency Anatolia reported that at least 30 tanks had been massed along the Gaza-Sinai border. In recent days, there have been multiple reports of clashes between Egyptian military and security forces with Islamist militants in Rafah, El Arish, and Sheikh Zuweid, among other locations. And on July 16, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon said that Israel had approved the stationing of two additional Egyptian infantry battalions to the demilitarized region of the Sinai.
Most important for Hamas is that Egypt has not only shut down the Rafah border crossing, but has also shut down many of the tunnels that Hamas uses to smuggle goods into and out of the Gaza Strip. Significant quantities of foodstuffs, steel, cement and fuel come through the tunnels, and Hamas has come to rely on the tunnels both as a means of importing such goods but also a source of income; Hamas taxes goods that come through the tunnels under its supervision. Hamas' Economy Minister Alaa al-Rafati told sources at al-Monitor that Egypt's political instability had thus far caused Hamas to lose $225 million in the past month, in addition to the fuel shortages and construction layoffs resulting from the traffic of goods being halted.
Hamas has thus far taken a cautious approach. Its current position -- being pressured by the Egyptian military and Israel, with no political ally in Cairo to help mitigate the impact on Gaza from military operations in the Sinai -- is a familiar one. Reports of Hamas testing long-range rockets capable of reaching Tel Aviv allow Hamas to signal to Israel that choking off Gaza's access to the outside world could well risk another costly military engagement in Gaza. Hamas does not necessarily want such a rematch at this point in time, but the threat of rocket attacks is the group's best leverage.
Hamas will have to deal with the Egyptian military, since it is the only credible intermediary with Israel and the physical force blocking Gaza's pervasive tunnel network. Now emboldened, the Egyptian military expects Hamas to redouble its own efforts to prevent the flow of weapons and militants into the Sinai, serving a mutual interest of limiting jihadist activity that could compete with Hamas in the area. Fatah is also hoping that a pressured Hamas in Gaza will finally give into reconciliation efforts and rejoin a government with Fatah to end the political division of the territories.
The extent of Hamas' cooperation will be limited, however. Though Hamas will maintain a working relationship with the Egyptian military, it is far less insulated today than it was during the Muslim Brotherhood's short-lived time in power. Hamas also has other patrons likely waiting for just an opportunity to reinforce their relationship. While relations were downgraded with Iran in recent months, they were certainly not eliminated, and it should be remembered that Iran played an integral role in supplying Hamas with long-range rockets capable of striking Israel's urban core. Tehran will try to use the Muslim Brotherhood's declining political fortunes in Egypt and the ongoing struggle of Syria's Sunni rebels to convince Hamas that it is better off maintaining strong ties with Iran in the current geopolitical landscape.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have already shown themselves to be looking for ways to roll back some of Qatar's recent diplomatic gains through their announced aid packages to Egypt as soon as Morsi was deposed. Hezbollah will also be interested in drawing Hamas closer at its time of need to keep the latter group from throwing support to Sunni rebels in Syria and Lebanon. As Gaza grows more isolated, military support and economic aid will be the most effective way to court Hamas. Iran and its patrons will compete with other regional rivals for that influence. Ultimately, Hamas will find someone who will do their best to deliver.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)