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Iranian President Hassan Rouhani received a fresh vote of confidence in Iran's parliament on Oct. 2, when 230 out of 290 lawmakers signed a statement expressing their approval of how he has handled the country's impending rapprochement with the United States.
Even though Rouhani has the intent and the political backing -- for now, at least -- to try to make Iran less isolated, he knows he must act quickly to convince U.S. President Barack Obama to deliver visible concessions, which would extend his mandate and propel negotiations forward. This is not a negotiation that will be wrapped up in six months, as has been proposed by Rouhani. In the preliminary stage of this dialogue, Obama can actually use the U.S. Congress' current obstinacy to his advantage as he forestalls the more complex process of lifting international sanctions.
One phone call and a handful of tweets later, Rouhani and Obama are now trying to make the difficult transition from gestures to concessions. Despite the three to six month timeline that Rouhani proposed and Obama cautiously endorsed, this process will occur incrementally. Rouhani had to articulate the timeline to convey the seriousness of his intent and to make clear to Obama that his political honeymoon won't last forever. That message was received. Now we enter the next stage.
But first, there is still a bit of history to address. In his address to the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 24, Obama acknowledged the U.S. role in the 1953 coup that overthrew Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. For Iran to reciprocate this gesture, it would need to acknowledge the Iranian hostage crisis.
For the gestures to become more substantial, the United States will expect to see Iran place verifiable limits on uranium enrichment and allow inspectors into its nuclear facilities. The P-5+1 negotiations, which will take place in Geneva on Oct. 15-16, will provide a forum for Iran to make that next move. It would be naive to think that the United States is going into that meeting without a framework of what Iran is willing to offer in this stage of the negotiation. Otherwise, the carefully crafted exchanges between Rouhani and Obama would probably not have taken place. If Iran delivers, then Obama has a small menu of sanctions under his authority to reciprocate without consulting Congress.
The most likely sanction to surface in this stage of the discussion is the U.S. ban on exports of civilian airline parts. Rouhani this week has already set the stage for this concession by raising the idea of resuming flights between the United States and Iran. Obama declared earlier in his presidency that he would be willing to allow the sale of General Electric Co. engines for U.S.-made aircraft operated by Iran, but he later blocked the potential sale with an executive order that declared Iran Air a proliferation entity. Obama has full executive authority now to repeal that order in the less controversial context of humanitarian safety for civilian passengers.
We then come to the energy issue. Rouhani's mandate to pursue this negotiation rests on an expectation that he will be able to relieve Iran from hard-hitting energy-related sanctions. Iran's energy vulnerability will be addressed in the negotiation, but, again, in incremental steps.
If Iran demonstrates a real commitment to the negotiation through preliminary concessions, Obama can extend more waivers to consumers of Iranian oil and relax the definition of what it means to "significantly reduce" their intake of Iranian oil to receive those waivers. He can also apply pressure on the U.S. Senate to sit on another draft of sanctions legislation (already moved through the House of Representatives) designed to cut further into Iranian exports and patch up more loopholes. While such moves will be difficult for Rouhani to sell back home as a visible concession, Obama does have the authority to repeal Executive Order 13622, which covers transactions between the National Iranian Oil Company and "foreign financial institutions."
Here is where Obama's ongoing struggle with Congress can work to his advantage. The majority of sanctions against Iran -- from those involving pistachios to energy investment and exports to gasoline supply to shipping to insurance to financial transactions, are codified in U.S. legislation, thereby denying the president the flexibility to repeal these measures unilaterally. However, Obama has little reason to sacrifice his most effective lever in the negotiation until he can be assured that a deal is within sight. This will come later as Iran parses out its concessions over the next several months.
Obama can meanwhile use the excuse of an intractable Congress to focus his attention on the sanctions under his executive authority to move the dialogue along. Rouhani will in turn use the threat of factional resistance back home to pressure Obama to come through with more substantial concessions. There are real constraints on both sides, but those constraints will also be exaggerated for the negotiations.
This will be the moment of truth in U.S.-Iranian talks. Obama is trying to establish his foreign policy legacy. If Rouhani can maintain enough support at home to forge ahead, and if it is clear that a deal is within reach, Obama could absorb the political risk of battling with -- or past -- Congress to see a deal through. Executive orders passed in the name of national security, along with the powers that reside in the executive authority to enforce (or not enforce) legislated sanctions are at his disposal. The extent to which he exercises that authority will depend on how far Iran shows it is willing and able to go in the negotiation. This is a process that will take time to negotiate, much less implement, but we cannot underestimate the seriousness of the intent on both sides to give this an honest attempt.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)