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Afghan President Hamid Karzai on 27 August had made his 20th visit to Pakistan and the first since the election of Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister, in a bid to improve strained relations between the two countries and restarting the stalled peace process with the Taliban.
The initial outcome of the visit disappointed analysts as it led to no agreements or specific statements on the key issues of Taliban peace talks. However the visit showed results after Pakistan released seven detainees in the first week of September[i] and then on 21 September acceded to Karzai’s key request by releasing former Afghan Taliban deputy chief Mullah Baradar[ii], keeping alive the possibility of some sort of negotiation with the Taliban in the future. To add to the tentative situation there appears to be some dissension within the Taliban itself on the peace talks.[iii]
The possibility of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban have had an overbearing hold on the Afghanistan endgame. Likely outcome of the peace negotiations and its timing (pre/post 2014) virtually cleaves the possible future scenarios into two categories; one, Taliban agrees to a peaceful option and two, it continues on the present trajectory for a military solution. The question at hand is what does India do proactively to safeguard its interests or hedge its position till this ‘Taliban’ penny drops?
Get a Plan B
Notwithstanding the existing warm and friendly relations with Afghanistan and the diplomatic capital being expended to extend this cordiality post 2014, India has to have a ‘Plan B’. A plan that moves beyond the ‘Kabuliwali’ typecast and notions such as “a Pashtun does not fight outside his country.” Afghanistan is home to a large number of foreign terrorist groups whose motivation to fight resides in concepts such as the ‘Islamic Caliphate’ and ‘global jihad,’ which are impossible to resolve or reconcile. Afghanistan is also the world’s largest producer and trafficker of opium and sits on one of the biggest cache of illegal weapons - two issues India can no longer ignore. Parallels must be drawn from Libya, Iraq and Syria on the potential fallout of an ungoverned Afghanistan on the region. C Raja Mohan recently even suggested that India should be conscious of the limitations imposed by geography on its dynamics with Afghanistan and focus on insulating itself from the negative consequences of the new phase that has begun to unfold on country's northwestern frontiers.[iv] Insulate, by having a Plan B in place based on the answer to the question: which is worse for India – Afghanistan governed by the Taliban or Afghanistan wracked by civil war.
Pak-Afghan Relations
The next issue is the Pak-Afghan relations. The lack of progress on the Taliban and Afghan reconciliation over-shadowed the other objective of Karzai’s recent visit; it was to improve strained relations with Pakistan which have been at low ebb since the skirmishes on the border and the fiasco of the Taliban political office in Doha. Issues requiring attention included repatriation of refugees, narcotics control, trade including transit trade, energy, transportation links, water sharing, management of the border etc.
Let us give credence to this maddening idea that a stable Pakistan with cordial relations with Afghanistan would not only put an end to its negative stimulus in that country but also prevent these threats from spilling over the Durand line. To that end positive developments in Afghan-Pak relations must be welcomed (and where possible ‘tri-lateralised’) as they need not necessarily come at the cost of Indian interests. Peace in Afghanistan serves Indian interests.
US Factor
The US factor in AfPak is the third issue. Karzai’s trip came after the visit by US secretary of State, John Kerry to both the countries. Kerry’s visit would have pressed an agenda of economic cooperation and facilitation of the US drawdown. Even as Karzai and Sharif met in Islamabad, NATO logistic convoys were attacked by the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Washington is trying to work with Pakistan towards the safe withdrawal of US troops and equipment, the establishment of an effective counterterrorism programme, and the promotion of political stability in Afghanistan. India would do well to assume that US interests in Af-Pak will decline and refocus elsewhere from the present circumstances after it secures its drawdown from the region.
Iran
The fourth issue is the Iranian interest in Afghanistan and the opportunity it presents to India. The signing of a strategic cooperation agreement with Afghanistan on security, intelligence and economic matters on Rouhani’s first day in office indicates that the Iranian Government has a strong desire to improve relations with its eastern neighbour. The strategic agreement also states that the national security offices of both signatories will engage via trilateral mechanisms with the national security offices of India and Russia.[v] The agreement to cooperate on security matters with India and Russia, but not with Pakistan, indicates the potential for Indo-Iranian cooperation on Afghanistan. India should mend its relations with Iran; the two countries share common interests, which will only grow as the Pakistan-China relations deepen and Chinese domination of Central Asia increases.
Other Measures
Back home the analyst’s prescription for Afghanistan, not surprisingly, has swung from talking to the Taliban[vi], to palming off our mothballed T-55s and Mig23s to improve our prospects in Afghanistan post-2014.[vii] There are two broad perceptions of the Afghan Taliban- one that portrays it as a fierce independent proud entity which has landed up in the ISI cage due to a twist of circumstances and the second that sees it as basic hunter-killer entity remote controlled from Rawalpindi. It is first perception that drives the ‘let’s Talk to the Taliban’ argument. For the Indian plan B this option seems unpalatable to the political establishment. However, training Afghan security forces and providing logistics and maintenance support suits Indian strategic intent, as it contributes meaningfully, enhances combat potential and yet is neutral and non-lethal.
Counter Pakistani diplomacy by pushing for issues that compel it to ratchet down its aggression, aids Indian interests and yet appeals to the international constituency. Call for transit trade with Afghanistan through Pakistan and test Pakistan’s rhetoric on ‘we want trade not aid.’ Also extend regional development initiatives to Afghanistan through Pakistan. The South Asian electricity grid (SARI) is one such possibility. Finally, persevere with soft power. Complete all ongoing developmental projects in Afghanistan. It is the key differentiator between friendship and exploitation.
Monish Gulati is an independent Delhi based Defence Analyst
By Special Arrangement with The Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (http://www.claws.in)