.png)
.jpg)
More than 3,000 prominent Afghans gathered in Kabul Nov. 21 to hold council at Afghanistan's Loya Jirga, or grand assembly. Afghan President Hamid Karzai opened the four-day proceedings with an expression of support for the most critical issue facing the council: a post-2014 deal with the United States known as the bilateral security agreement. In a controversial move, however, he proposed that his successor should be the one to secure any such accord.
The bilateral security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan, a proposal to secure an external military presence beyond the predicted coalition withdrawal date of 2014, would likely extend existing training, advisory and support missions. More important, it will guarantee the inflow of $4 billion in foreign aid annually. This money, along with advisory personnel, has been crucial in maintaining the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces. An effectual security and governance framework is widely regarded as the key to keeping Afghanistan stable after the planned U.S. withdrawal.
Karzai's surprising statement is most likely evidence of political wrangling. It is widely assumed that the United States will count on Afghanistan's overwhelming dependence on external financial and military aid to see the bilateral security agreement through before presidential elections take place in April 2014, which may introduce another set of political challenges.
Even if the planned elections run smoothly, which is far from guaranteed, the new Afghan president would have to push through the bilateral security agreement by the end of 2014 if no consensus were reached by the jirga. The proposed deal already has a number of sticking points, not least of which are issues concerning the legal status of U.S. soldiers in country and parameters allowing for raids into private Afghan homes. Karzai has personally objected to these tactics, widely considered necessary for the capture of high-value targets. Further delays will greatly complicate already trying negotiations focused on sealing the agreement.
Karzai understands these dynamics as well as anyone, but much to the frustration of Western diplomats, he has a history of making dramatic public statements that are often designed to further his stance in negotiations or to assuage a domestic audience. In this case, his last-minute deflection probably was made for both reasons. The United States is eager to solidify the bilateral security agreement so it can plan ahead accordingly and avoid a sudden pullout, the repercussions of which were evident in places such as Iraq. Karzai has potentially seen an opportunity to wring out further concessions by creating disruptions during such a critical time. It is also likely that he is trying to preserve his political legacy, which would be tarnished in the eyes of some critics by an open invitation for foreign occupiers to remain in the country.
The bilateral security agreement is very important for both sides. Without such an accord, the United States would have little choice but to exercise the "zero option," leaving no troops in Afghanistan past 2014. A continued military presence serves two critical functions. First, it directly supports the Afghan National Security Forces through training, intelligence sharing and limited offensive support. Indirectly, it advises and instructs Afghan forces on how to function as an effective military in the longer term. The proposed 5,000- to 15,000-strong residual U.S. presence would continue the mission to transition the Afghan military into a self-sufficient force, which it cannot claim to be by the end of 2014. The Afghan military has come a long way in many respects, but it is still functionally dependent on key elements that the United States and its allies provide.
Military Realities
An essential part of keeping any military force functional is resource management. This can be very hard to do effectively. At the heart of the issue is the appropriate allocation of money, so that soldiers can be recruited and paid and suitable equipment can be procured and maintained. Essential materials such as food, water, fuel and ammunition have to be accounted for and distributed to where they are needed. The International Security Assistance Force has been instrumental in coordinating logistics and resource management for the fledgling Afghan military throughout the past decade. During the transition of responsibility, which has been ongoing for a number of years, coalition forces have been teaching these skills to their Afghan counterparts. The process remains incomplete, however, mostly because of endemic corruption in the security apparatus. Afghanistan's patronage systems and customs have historically made this a serious problem. Without a U.S. or allied footprint in the country after 2014, the Afghan military will lose much-needed help. More important, a failure to eradicate or control corruption will call into question the willingness of other nations to uphold their pledges of billions of dollars in funding.
The continuation of foreign aid is vitally important to Afghanistan. Total civilian and military aid totaled $15.7 billion in 2011, equivalent to Afghanistan's entire gross domestic product that year. The Afghan military's requirement for resources far outstrips what would be provided under the normal economy of Afghanistan. Losing foreign aid entirely would essentially cause Afghan forces to atrophy. The lack of a central security structure in Afghanistan would result in a chaotic return to tribalism. In addition, foreign aid directly provides and supports the only legitimate revenue streams in a very poor country. If these were to dry up, the black market -- dominated by the prolific cash crop opium -- becomes the only realistic option for most of the population.
The Poppy Dilemma
The 2013 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime assessment of the Afghan opium market estimates that cultivation is at or near an all-time high. Much of this trend is currently driven by dry opium prices that are dramatically outcompeting other illicit agricultural products. While some foreign aid is used to subsidize conventional crops to discourage farmers from cultivating opium, significant foreign investment is allocated to poppy eradication efforts.
Opium is a national security issue for Afghanistan. Its cultivation and movement to market directly funds the various militant groups that operate inside and across its borders. The illegality and profitability of opium encourages fractionalization, with self-styled warlords presiding over cultivation territories, fueling organized crime and further corruption. The reduction or cessation of foreign aid will dramatically reinforce this trend.
The war in Afghanistan is quietly coming to a close, though true stability remains far off. The central government, bolstered by the current Afghan military, has proved that it can maintain enough stability to meet U.S. imperatives for the region with some assistance. The Afghan military has demonstrated an ability to lead combat operations. For the United States at least, some instability and fighting is expected and cannot realistically be prevented. The imperative is that violence does not reach a level that threatens the creation of a government or creates a security vacuum that would engender transnational security threats. A spillover of violence into Pakistan is a concern, as is anything that threatens its currently fragile government or, more important, the security of its nuclear weapons.
To realistically achieve enduring security in the region, the United States and its allies need to keep at least a small presence on the ground. The requirement to continue funding the Afghan government and its security forces past 2014 is also a certainty. The Loya Jirga is the first important step, one that will allow the process to move forward with confidence into 2014. Continued delay or outright rejection of the bilateral security agreement could make for a chaotic future for Afghanistan, one that could see the country once again become a serious international threat. The United States will put a lot of political pressure on Karzai to commit to the agreement as soon as possible. It will be more politically feasible for him to do so while still president than for his successor, who will likely be far more politically constrained. Despite a contentious start to the process, the undertaking will likely be finished under Karzai, and before next April.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)