Middle East: Battleground Syria

Ganapathy Vanchinathan 2014-05-12

As the Syrian strife rages into its fourth year, on 01 May 2014, barrel bombs delivered on an outdoor market in Aleppo by Syrian military aircraft killed 33 people. Just a day earlier, on 30 April 2014, a barrel bomb dropped by Syrian Air Force on an elementary school in Aleppo killed 20, including 17 children. A barrel bomb is a type of improvised explosive device (used by the Syrian Air Force during the ongoing civil war) made from a barrel filled with high explosives and other shrapnel (like nails) and/or oil, dropped from a helicopter, detonated, and capable of causing devastating destruction and carnage.

Roots
The civil war in Syria, fanned by the Arab Spring, had its roots in the 15 March 2011 protests in the southern Syrian city of Daraa after the arrest and torture of some teenagers who painted revolutionary slogans on a school wall.  Security forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing some civilians, that prompted unrest nationwide demanding President Assad's resignation. Further use of force by the Assad Government only stoked the protestor’s determination and by July 2011, there were thousands protesting in towns and cities across Syria. Out of these protests, the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) formed with the aim of bringing down the Assad Regime, the confrontation spawning many battlefields between various rebel and government forces. Damascus, Aleppo and Homs were the cities where maximum fighting took place. The nature of the violence has been dotted with killings and massacres by one side and reprisal attacks by the other side, against each other’s community or location inhabited by the community they represent. The al-Assad government is charged with using chemical weapons in an attack on Syrian civilians that killed hundreds in Aug 2013.

Ethno-Religious Dimensions
The ethno-religious composition of Syria is Arab-Sunni (60 percent), Arab-Alawite (Shia Muslims) (12 percent), Kurd-Sunni (9 percent), Greek Orthodox Christian (9 percent), Assyrian Syriac Christian (4 percent), Arab-Druze (3 percent), Arab-Ismaeli (2 percent), Turkmen-Sunni, Circassian-Sunni, Armenian-Christian and others (1percent).  Bashar al-Assad belongs to the Shiite Alawite Sect. Seen very simply, it is a case of the minority ruling a country with majority Sunni population. The Christian denomination and most other Shiite sects of the population are aligned with al Assad, and fear the takeover by any Islamist denomination.  Unlike most regimes in Middle East, the Assad disposition is not religiously extreme. The Alawites practice a unique little known form of Islam dating back to the 9th/ 10th century and have been historically isolated from mainstream society and persecuted by the Sunni majority. Their beliefs include permissibility of alcohol, celebration of Christmas and Zoroastrian New Year, thus making them highly suspect in the eyes of Sunnis and more orthodox Shias. The protest against Assad, therefore, does not emanate from protest against religious extremism; it has been against inability of his government to implement reforms, control corruption, dictatorial governance and gag on freedom of expression. The fight between the Government and rebels is, however, not so simplistic. The armed conflict has grown both in complexity and numbers since it started. There are estimated to be 1,000 groups or so with some 100,000 fighters - the spectrum ranging from secular moderates to Islamists/jihadists linked to al-Qaeda. The ideology and tactics of each of these groups have ensured that there is no common umbrella.  For instance, the violent and brutal tactics of the Islamists and Jihadists are against the operating principles of the large secular groups. As the rebels remain deeply divided, apart from common standpoint of needing to end Bashar al-Assad’s rule, Assad continues to retain an upper hand.

Human Tragedy
Syria's conflict crossed an important threshold in August 2012, when the International Committee of the Red Cross declared it a civil war. The conflict has destroyed entire neighbourhoods, forced millions of people from their homes causing untold human misery.  The human toll of the conflict thus far reads as under:

·         Over 1,50,000 persons are estimated to have been killed in three years by various activists groups keeping count. The UN estimates as was 1,00,000 on July 2013 but has since stopped updating the toll as it could longer verify it.  That would mean at an average 45 people per day are dying in the conflict in Syria over the last three years. To understand this colossal figure it should be compared with the sum total body count in Iraq from 2003 to 2013 in 11 years (includes civilians, insurgents, combatants from all forces operated in Iraq) which is 184,512.

·         Over 2 million have fled the country.  The UNHCR quotes 2.4 million refugees registered with another tens of thousands waiting to register with their office. The actual number may be higher. Of the refugees, 75 percent are women and children. Of these, 50 percent are girls while 25 percent are boys under 18.

·         Over 4 million Syrians are estimated to be Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), displaced within the borders of Syria.

Proxy War
In Syria, what started in 2011 as a popular uprising against the President Bashar al Assad and his Baath Party government has mutated into a most complex multi-dimensional proxy war. Syria has become a battlefield not only for regional countries, but also for major players like USA, Russia, China and the EU.  Russia, which supports the current regime, warned the US and its allies against taking action against Syria when Syria was blamed for a chemical attack. Russia was instrumental in getting Syria to agree giving up chemical weapons and backs the Geneva Communiqué. It has maintained that Syria's future should be decided by Syrians and blocked anti-Assad resolutions at the UNSC. It continues to supply Syria with arms, including missile systems and aircraft. The USA on the other hand has been backing the opposition rebel groups. Even though the USA, UK and France do not want Assad’s regime, increasing influence of jihadist groups linked to Al Qaeda have turned them wary of the configuration that rebel groups are turning out to be, presumably driven by the concern of security threats the battle hardened Jihadists of Syria could later pose to their own nations. The main regional proxy war is being played out between Sunni states Saudi Arabia and Qatar and Shia Iran. While Iran backs Bashar al Assad, Saudis and Qataris are backing Sunni militant groups fighting against him. There have been speculations that Saudi has pressurised Pakistan to recruit and train volunteers to fight against the Syrian regime in return for their $1.5 billion loan extended to Pakistan early this year.  The Shia-Sunni tensions also spill over on to the Pak-Iran border, with Sunni militant groups operating in border regions of the countries, like Jundallah, targeting Iranian security forces. Turkey is on the same page as the Western powers, while China and Iraq tow the Russian and Iranian line. Israel, traditional foe of Syria, may predictably cheer a potential downfall of Assad, but will have much to chew on if radical Islamists gain control of Syria. The proxy war in Syria is truly playing out.

Where is Syria Headed?
Into its fourth year, violence continuing, with no diplomatic/military solutions in sight the Syrian Conflict appears to have become an “intractable conflict” as one think tank puts it. Recent events in Ukraine have drawn away the focus of influential countries, giving Assad a respite to harden and consolidate his grip over his hapless country, a very inopportune development. Without adequate focus on Syria, the crisis may take years to resolve.  Another major concern of the civil war in Syria is the breakdown of the multi-ethnic nature of the Eastern Arab States of post-Ottoman period, meaning Syria, Iraq, Jordon and Lebanon. Syria's tenuous land borders with Iraq and Lebanon are beginning to merge, sparking the beginning of the fragmentation driven by the heightened sectarian nature of the conflict. Neighbouring Lebanon, already sliced along sectarian lines, with influx of refugees and Hezbollah’s support to al-Assad’s regime, has given rise to a new generation of Lebanese Salafis and jihadis seeking to radicalise Syria and Lebanon and reduce Shia influence. Similar is the situation along the eastern border with Iraq and northern border with Turkey, where Islamist Jihadist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is radicalising the population. The chance of rapprochement amongst the various factions and the regime are slim. Opposition elements will not compromise with representatives of what they perceive is a brutal regime, even though the population inhabiting the opposition-held territories may prefer otherwise.

Presidential elections scheduled for 03 Jun 2014, are unlikely to be recognised by countries, which want Assad out, as they will not consider them free and fair. Out of 24 prospective candidates, the Supreme Court has approved only Assad and two other candidates as contenders. Even though both candidates are from opposition blocs recognised by the government, they are not expected to stand any chance against Assad. Diplomatically, therefore this election will leave the scorecard unchanged. The prognosis for Syria appears bleak.

By Special Arrangement with The Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (http://www.claws.in)