As US-Saudi ties Soften, Hard Days for Assad

Monish Gulati 2014-05-21

The US President Barack Obama visited Saudi Arabia at the end of March for his first visit to the country since 2009 and met King Abdullah. The visit came amid rising Saudis concerns about the commitment of their security provider, the US, and its willingness to stand by its traditional allies.

Though fresh ground was not broken during the visit, there appear to be four perceptible changes in US policy to accommodate Saudi concerns. First is the scaling up of US drone operations against the Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula. Second is the softening of stand on aid , specifically military aid, to Egypt; third seems to be the tacit US approval to the involvement of Pakistan in gulf security both in terms of manpower and military equipment; Lastly and more tangible of all the outcomes is the renewed US push to arm the Syrian moderate opposition against the Assad regime. The US decision not to carry out military strikes against the Assad regime in the aftermath of the chemical attacks on civilians had severely impacted the US-Saudi relations.

There is another narrative on the arming of the ‘moderate’ Syrian opposition which relates to the crisis in Ukraine. With increasing calls on the US administration to use force other than secret drone attacks or covert operations in response to strategic challenges in Eastern Europe, the US may have opted to do so in Syria. It is felt that enhanced military response in Syria might not end the civil war there, but could prevent the eruption of a new one in Ukraine.[1]

This article looks the US decision to step up  military coercive measures against the Assad regime in Syria as an element of its foreign policy to reassure its traditional allies in the Middle East particularly Saudi Arabia and  to counter critics back home of the increasing “isolationism” in US global strategic outlook.

Arming of the Syrian Opposition
On 07 April Israel’s Debkafile website reported that two moderate Syrian rebel militias, the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian Revolutionary Front, had been supplied with US weapons, including anti-tank BGM-71 TOW missiles. The Hazm movement (Harkat Hazm), part of the opposition Free Syrian Army, for the first time received more than 20 TOW anti-tank missiles which have used them in flashpoint areas of Idlib, Aleppo and Latakia provinces in the north.[2] Saudi Arabian fighter jets stationed at the kingdom’s Faisal Air Base at Tabuk near Jordan reportedly provided air cover during the arms transfer. The CIA reportedly plans to send more arms to the Syrian opposition and the 50 TOW missile systems that had been sent to Harakat Hazam were a part of a “test” or pilot program.[3]

Complex Situation
The US decision to provide arms to the Syrian opposition was made in a complex environment. Presence of multitude of jihadi groups including foreign fighters with differing allegiance, cross borders influences, sectarian affiliations, regional aspirations and infighting has made the Syrian opposition structure chaotic and confusing. Earlier Western attempts to arm some of these groups saw arms proliferating to the hard-line extremist factions through looting and defections.

The US, in addition to a ‘pilot’ programme to arm moderate opposition with anti-tank missiles, in its recent response to the Syrian National Coalition's appeals has upgraded their mission status from informal to formal (Coalition offices in Syria will now be considered "foreign missions”), and promised to give a further $27 million in nonlethal aid to the opposition, bringing the total so far to $278 million. There is also been a fresh narrative on the situation being put out which includes the identification of a operationally effective moderate Syrian group,  credible explanation for appearance of non-western high lethality weapons with Syrian opposition and renewed threat of use of chemical weapons on the civilians.

The Narrative
The first element of this narrative is revival of the threat of use of chemical weapons against civilians. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) said Syria has turned over 92.5 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile and the remaining eight percent of the regime's stockpile is at a government airfield near Damascus, but cannot be transferred yet because rebel forces control the local roads. Also a "more specific" list of Syrian chemical weapons has been obtained by the OPCW after its inspectors reported discrepancies on the ground.

However concerns have been expressed by Western intelligence services that Syria still has a significant and undeclared arsenal of chemical weapons, including crude chlorine-filled bombs, secret stockpiles of sophisticated nerve gasses or their components to rebuild a larger-scale, higher-grade chemical weapons effort once the Assad regime moves out of the international spotlight.[4] There continue to be reports of use of chlorine gas and at least 10 chlorine gas attacks have been reported out since April 10 in the border areas of the Idlib and Hama provinces.[5] This comes even as some analysts suspect Al Nusra of being the likely perpetrator of the August 2013 Ghouta sarin attack, with the aim to lure the West into attacking the Syrian regime.[6]

A hitherto unknown group - Harakat Hazm has been zeroed-in as the moderate Syrian opposition group suitable to receive US arms. The group was formed in January 2013 after the merger of twenty-two separate rebel units and has its own distinctive insignia: a stylized sword bearing the movement's name. According to its founding documents, it is a "revolutionary political organization with a military wing. The group's leadership is a mix of military officers and civilians. [7] Harakat Hazm besides being an effective military force (not the "spray and pray" fire variety) is also reportedly secular in orientation. However in Syria foreign officials in the past have created suitable organisations to present an acceptable face to the Syrian insurgency.  The Southern Front, comprising 52 groups is one such grouping. There are also opposition groups which claim have broken away from Islamist groups only to make themselves eligible for assistance from the west.

Harakat Hazm have been reported operating Russian T-55 medium tanks, 122 mm D-30 Howitzers artillery guns,  ZPU-4 23mm towed anti-aircraft guns and SA-7 Grail MANPADs. It has been suggested that such weaponry has been acquired over last three years without significant foreign aid through ‘battlefield pickups’ ie taking equipment left over from skirmishes with the Syrian Army. This opens the window for western-financed Russian and Chinese equipment or Saudi purchased Pakistani weapons for the Syrian opposition.

Yet it must be said to US’s credit that the lessons from Libya and Afghanistan appear not to have been lost. The US unease and caution on the arming of the Syrian opposition continues. The CIA wants to use fingerprint scanners and GPS devices to make sure Syria's rebels target Assad -- not the West. There is a thought to install fingerprint scanners, which would prevent the missiles from being fired by anyone who hadn't been vetted by the US. Another suggestion calls for a GPS-based system that would render a shoulder-fired missile inoperable if it was taken beyond designated areas.

Assessment
In addition to addressing Saudi concerns and those regarding its policy in the Middle East, the Obama administration feels that even though providing arms will not turn the tide of the conflict decisively against Assad, it could improve the US chances of finding support among successful revolutionary forces, if and when the Assad regime falls. [9] US also feels that Syrian militant opposition groups such as the Al-Nusrah and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are more extreme in their ideology than even Al Qaeda and need to be countered.

Notwithstanding the narrative above, in the context of US efforts to reduce its footprint in Afghanistan and resists operational engagement in Ukraine, one would observe that pressures from its relations with Saudi Arabia appear to have compelled US to get its strategy “down and dirty” once again.

By Special Arrangement with The Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (http://www.claws.in)