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Finalising a new bilateral United States-Philippines defence cooperation agreement comes off as a bulwark to Filipino interests in Southeast Asia and a reiteration of renewed American engagement in the region. The announcement was made on President Barack Obama’s trip to the Philippines in end April 2014 as the last leg of his recent week-long four-nation Asian tour. In fact, many argue that this defence agreement with America’s “oldest ally” in Asia was perhaps the most noteworthy upshot of Obama’s Asian sojourn.
The pact provides increased flexibility and greater room to manoeuvre responses while dealing with threats to peace and stability in the region and the alliance is seen as part of America’s broader vision for the Asia Pacific. The defence cooperation agreement will not only increase the United States’ presence in the region but shall become the validation of increased US military assistance to Manila as a major non-NATO ally.”
This arrangement can simply not be read as a pledge to defend the Philippines. It is about enhanced dispersal of American forces in the region, thereby buttressing the US’ commitment of its much hyped Asian rebalance amidst Washington’s critical internal considerations including budget constraints and political divisions that cast uncertainty over the long-term sustainability of this policy.
Termed as “the most significant defence agreement” concluded with the Philippines in decades, the US appears determined to pursue policies based on its strategic objectives and those of its allies, be it Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines. While addressing Filipino and US Armed Forces at Fort Bonifacio, Manila, President Obama gave out an implicit warning to China saying that international law must be upheld, freedom of navigation be preserved, and commerce must not be impeded. Obama stressed that disputes must be resolved peacefully and not by intimidation or force.
Significantly, the latest defence cooperation pact further strengthens the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines of August 1951, which remains in force indefinitely. The treaty reaffirms faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations with a desire to strengthen the fabric of peace and advocated the concept of collective defence towards a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area. Significantly, Article II advocates developing individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, while Article III argues support and determination whenever the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.
The present 10-year Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) supports long-term modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as it works to establish a minimum credible defence. Although the EDCA’s logistics specifics have yet to be fleshed out, it is expected to grant American troops, ships and planes rotational access to facilities of the armed forces of the Philippines, but not permanent bases which are prohibited under the constitution of the Philippines.
Philippines’ present Benigno Aquino III government, having lost Scarborough Shoal to Chinese control during a 2012 standoff in currently in a bind as it struggles to keep a handful of Philippine troops on the Second Thomas Shoal supplied with basic necessities. Resultantly, Aquino is facing immense domestic pressure to reconsider its South China Sea policy vis-à-vis China as levels of Chinese coercive diplomacy continues to rise.
According to a US Public Affairs Section release, the United States has already begun providing $40 million in technical expertise, training, and equipment through the Global Security Contingency Fund to strengthen the Philippines’ security operations and maritime domain awareness capabilities, the United States is supporting the AFP as it transitions from internal security to external defence (as outlined in the Philippine government’s 2011 “Internal Peace and Security Plan”).
This funding also assists the Philippine National Police as they assume a leading role in providing internal security and combating terrorism. Furthermore, Washington, through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is also helping to construct a Philippine National Coast Watch Center in Manila that will assist the Philippine Coast Guard in assuming increased responsibility for enhancing information sharing and inter-agency coordination in maritime security operations.
On its side, the Philippines has agreed allowing the United States access to its military bases under a new security deal. As per the draft accord, the Philippines will allow US forces joint use of facilities in several military bases like Manila, Clark, Palawan, Cebu, Nueva Ecija, and La Union. However, Manila reportedly has refused a request for use of civilian airfields and ports, like Subic Freeport Bay, Laoag and Davao international airports. It needs to be recalled that the 1991 Philippine government of Corazon Aquino had voted to close down the Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base—major American military facilities in Southeast Asia, with the United States ultimately withdrawing from the 60,000-acre Subic Bay naval base in 1992.
More recently, in May 2014, USS Chicago (SSN 721), a fast attack submarine arrived in Subic Bay for a routine port call thereby highlighting the military commitment between the two countries with US and Filipino marines practicing assaults as part of a war game in San Antonio town in the Zambales province of the South China Sea beach in the Philippines. The USS Chicago is part of the US Pacific Fleet homeported in Guam and is capable of supporting a multitude of missions including anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface ship warfare, strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
In the backdrop of China’s rising military and diplomatic aggression, the EDCA undoubtedly cements American commitment to its allies and interests in the Asia-Pacific, while only confirming that this just the beginning of what appears to be a long-drawn struggle for gaining primacy in influence across Asia.
By Special Arrangement with The Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (http://www.claws.in)