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On the first day of the month of Ramadan (June 29, 2014), the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate (state) was declared in Iraq by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (greater Syria) militants, and a caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was anointed to head it.
With its origins going as far back as 2004, the ISIS, after its recent spectacular successes in Iraq and Syria, has its Islamic caliphate presently straddling parts of Syria and Iraq. The envisioned caliphate though includes areas of the Middle East, Central and South Asia. The June 29 declaration of the caliphate also “clarified” that it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the caliph and support him.
This new Sunni Muslim religious entity seeks to override the prevailing regional political order. Vijay Prasad in his recent article in The Hindu commented, Al-Baghdadi has announced that “he wants to command a religion, not just a region. Of such delusions are great societies and cultures destroyed.”
The discourse in India on the ISIS crisis has largely focussed on the fate of the approximately 10,000 Indian workers in Iraq (besides the 46 nurses) and hundreds of thousands more in other Arab countries. The rise in oil prices to a nine-month high after the ISIS seized Mosul also grabbed attention as it raised the prospect of a disruption in supply from the world's sixth-largest oil producer. India imports 25 million tonnes of oil from Iraq every year, and is appreciably concerned regarding energy security and the impact of rising cost of oil on its economic growth. However, the rise of the ISIS holds more serious implications for India in its subtext.
ISIS
The ISIS has a characteristic manner of consolidating its authority in the territories it captures. After seizing the Iraqi city of Mosul and surrounding area, the ISIS gave an indication of how it would govern its dawla (state) by releasing a wathiqat al-madina (charter of the city) to Moslawis, as Mosul residents are known. The ISIS also has a governing strategy that includes social services, basic utilities (electricity and water), religious lectures, health and welfare programmes, da’wa (proselytizing) to local populations and a functioning bureaucracy, which includes an Islamic court system and a local police force.
Yet, al-Baghdadi in keeping with his caliph image, had imposed the dhimmi (second class, "tolerated" non-Muslim inhabitants) status on Christians in the ISIS–held town of Raqqa (Syria) in March this year. Dhimmi status, in traditional theology, is to be imposed by a caliph.
The ISIS declaration, including a more recent first video speech by al-Baghdadi, is unambiguous on the global nature of the ISIS's struggle. Baghdadi touched on issues regarding the persecution of Muslims in Myanmar and the Philippines as well as the French restriction on the wearing of the veil, and responded to accusations that the ISIS engages in irhab (terrorism).
The military capability of the ISIS in Iraq to expand the territories under its rule is limited. Therefore, its leaders are directly appealing to Muslims all over the world to support the caliphate and to rebel against existing governments. They also draw this subtle distinction between their success and that of Al-Qaeda. The declaration also has the potential to escalate the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites and is likely to impact the Muslim communities in the West as well.
Having declared its objective of creating a caliphate and succeeding in some measure in doing so, ISIS is likely to gain in strength, at least in the short term. It is likely to get support from marginalised fringe radical groups which have been upstaged in their respective countries by larger “mainstream” Islamist groups, including the Al-Qaeda. This includes the extremely violent terror groups which are in an uneasy relationship with Al-Qaeda. Even Al-Qaeda itself may step up its activities to regain its leadership status. Yet the ISIS will face resistance within the Muslim world, including from Sunnis in Iraq and Syria.
Why South Asia?
One question that begs attention is what attraction does South Asia hold for the ISIS, other than the fact that parts of the region feature in the map of the caliphate. The ISIS’ earlier avatar the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had it fighters initially drawn from Abu Musab al Zarqawi's networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and later merged with recruits from Syria, Iraq, and its neighbours. In addition, sectarianism in Pakistan and the Iran-Saudi power play in Afghanistan are likely to make the two countries quite receptive to the ISIS philosophy and its call to arms.
However, demographics is the key factor. Islam is the second largest religion in India, making up 14.6% of the country's population with about 177 million adherents; 10 percent of these are estimated to be Shias. According to some sources, the Indian Shia population is the world's third-largest after Iran and Pakistan, and equal to Iraq.
As per the Pew Research Center, in 2010 there were 49 Muslim-majority countries, with around 62% of the world's Muslims living in South and Southeast Asia. Almost one in three Muslims lives in South Asia: Pakistan (11.0%), India (10.9%), and Bangladesh (9.2%). On the other hand, while about 20% of Muslims live in Arab countries, Iraq and Syria together constitute just around 3 percent (Iraq - 1.9%, Syria - 1.3%).
Given the ISIS’ motivation and its sectarian tendencies, it will be viewing South Asia as the largest pool of potential recruits (Sunnis), staying in close proximity of the largest concentration of potential targets (Shias and non-Muslims).
Foreign Fighters in ISIS
Besides the fact that ISIS’ initial recruits came from the Af-Pak region, the ISIS caliphate will draw more foreign fighters from Central and South Asia and possibly from as far as Myanmar and Thailand. Its call has already drawn foreign fighters with various groups in Syria to its fold. At present ISIS is estimated to have upwards of 11,000 fighters spread between Iraq and Syria. Around 3,000 of who are estimated to be foreign fighters, with an estimated 500 coming from Western Europe.
Australia has become the largest per capita contributor of foreign fighters to the ISIS. An estimated 150 to 300 Australian citizens and residents have left the country to join radical militant groups in the Middle East. In India police and intelligence services have begun a transnational investigation into revelations that at least two Chennai college students are now training with jihadist groups in Syria, highly placed intelligence sources have told The Hindu. The All India Shia Husaini Fund (AISHF) said around 4,000 people had volunteered to travel to Iraq and fight against the ISIS militants.
Returnees
A related issue is that of volunteers who proceed to conflict zones for humanitarian and other non-combat related reasons. A relevant driver in the case of India is the protection of Shia holy shrines in Syria and Iraq. There were unconfirmed reports as late as last year of some Indians having gone to Syria to aid in the protection of Shia shrines. Some 30,000 Indian Shia Muslims have submitted their passports and are ready to travel to Iraq to defend Shiite holy shrines from the advancing Sunni Islamist insurgents by any means available. According to recruiters, a further 100,000 have pledged support.
The point here is that whatever their nature of motivation, the “returnees” coming back home would be radicalised and polarised to a degree, even if they themselves did not engage in sectarian violence.
Mosques in India have been reported to be denouncing the ISIS in their Friday sermons too. Many maulvis have been telling devotees at prayer meetings that the ISIS is not an outfit to look up to; their actions go against what Islam preaches. Indian agencies have requested Muslim leaders to sensitise the people on the impact of sectarianism.
The track record of India’s Muslims in eschewing sectarianism and violence has been outstanding compared to the neighbourhood and elsewhere in the world. However, their most severe test, courtesy the ISIS, maybe around the corner.
By Special Arrangement with : South Asia Monitor (http://www.southasiamonitor.org)