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India has often been criticized for its lacklustre Central Asia policy. India banked too much on US presence in Afghanistan, and for quite a few years after 9/11 it was never realized that the US will leave Afghanistan one day without finally finishing the Taliban.
India also toned down its strategic policy in Central Asia to address Pakistan’s unfounded apprehensions as to Indian presence justifying its support to Afghan Taliban which found expression through Americans.
The Pakistani military-intelligence establishment successfully put up an act of being paranoid to any Indian presence in Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbours, and in a way was able to pass off this apparent paranoia to certain extent to Washington when imaginary concepts like good Taliban-bad Taliban were being discussed by Western policy makers.
As a result, India’s Central Asia policy during the first decade of the 21st century was more or less ad hoc and country specific. It was lacking in objectivity and broader strategic planning, and whatever was there was sluggishly implemented. India to a great extent made its policy subservient to Washington’s plans for Afghanistan, and made itself look like a marginal player in Central Asia’s geo-politics.
In this process, India lost the close cooperation and diplomatic support it used to get from Russia in Central Asia. A particular instance of this is India losing the Ayni Air Base in Tajikistan. In the aftermath of the 1999 IC-814 hijack, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government in 2002 arranged for Indian military presence at the strategically located Ayni Air Base to deal with such a security emergency under a tripartite informal arrangement with the Tajiks and Russians as part of which India was to refurbish the base.
However, India had to give up its plans in 2007 even after putting in an investment of $1.77 million due to Russian pressure on Tajikistan, as Russians were supposedly wary of New Delhi’s growing proximity with the US. In the meantime, China has firmly extended its influence in the region, which also bolsters Pakistan’s strategic prospects in Central Asia.
But with American forces leaving behind an Afghanistan with a Taliban which has been able to sustain its guerrilla campaign for 13 years, the regional security concerns are mounting. Moreover, the recent happenings in Iraq where the Iraqi army has weakened in its fight with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) also add to concerns of the Taliban gaining strongholds in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal. This time again, regional players like India, Iran, Russia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan will be at the forefront of trouble.
While Afghanistan grapples with a presidential election dispute which has Pashtun-Tajik dimensions, Tajikistan has a stabilizing role in Afghanistan through its influence over the Tajik leadership in Afghanistan. However, the importance of Tajikistan does not end there. If Afghanistan is to yet again slip into chaos after withdrawal of US forces with the Taliban gaining strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan, it will have serious security ramifications for all regional players, particularly for India and Iran.
In the past, during Taliban rule in Afghanistan, India had to face security emergencies like the IC-814 hijack. Indian missions in Afghanistan continue to be repeatedly targeted by groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Moreover, India is engaged in major reconstruction projects across Afghanistan and there are well-founded apprehensions as to the safety of personnel involved in these projects. The abduction of Indian workers in Iraq by ISIS further underlines such threat scenarios.
Similarly, after takeover of Kabul by the Taliban in 1996, many attempts were made to attack Iranian interests and target the Shia minority in Afghanistan. Selective killings of Shias were organized by the then Taliban government. In Bamiyan province alone around 5,000 Shias were killed by Taliban. The Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif was attacked and 10 Iranian diplomats were killed. Iran had to respond by massing 300,000 troops on its borders with Afghanistan and threatening to punish the Taliban regime.
All this calls for closer cooperation between India, Iran and Tajikistan on regional security. India in particular needs to have some kind of Special Forces presence in the region to deal with security emergencies like the IC-814 hijack episode. Such presence will give projection of India’s counter-terrorism capabilities in the region, enhance its strategic footprint and assure all forces working for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan of India’s intentions to sustain and conserve their efforts.
India lost the chance of stationing special troops at the Ayni Air Base due to Russian apprehensions about India’s proximity with the US. Now, with the US all set to leave Afghanistan with a resurgent Taliban, New Delhi needs to reorient its position and try to gain back the policy coherence it used to have with Russia in pre-9/11 days.
Russian cooperation continues to be an essential pre-requisite of successful initiatives in Central Asia. Moreover, with the Barack Obama administration focussing on domestic issues, Russia under Vladimir Putin is taking the lead in many peace initiatives like the Syrian chemical weapons issue and playing a proactive role in the global war on terror. It is notable here that Russians were quick to send Sukhois and air personnel to Iraq to check the advance of ISIS while the US remained confused.
An unstable Afghanistan will directly ignite Chechen insurgency and will also affect the security scenario in Central Asian states. So, after the US troop withdrawal, Russia is the key regional power having much at stake in Afghanistan.
India needs to step up work on various efforts that are underway which develop stakes of the Central Asian states in a stable Afghanistan. The recent understanding between India, Iran and Afghanistan to connect Iran’s Chabahar port with Afghanistan through the road is a right step in this direction. India should try to involve landlocked Central Asian countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan more closely with the project which will give them access to the Indian Ocean. India needs to take initiative to integrate Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) whereby it is intended to move freight from India to Iran by ship; from Iran to Armenia and Georgia by rail and road; and from Georgia onwards to Russia and Europe.
In particular, India should try to connect Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway link, which is a part of INSTC, providing them access to Europe through Armenia and Georgia. This will also provide a safe transit passage to Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves to Europe as well as the Indian Ocean. Such initiatives will not just promote regional stability through economic integration but will also augment India’s clout in the region.
By Special Arrangement with : South Asia Monitor (http://www.southasiamonitor.org)