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The election of Hassan Rouhani as the President of Iran re-invigorated the dialogue between Iran and the P5+1 on the long drawn Iranian nuclear deadlock.
Rouhani’s effective media management and his previous track record in the nuclear dialogue provided credible reasons to cheer, both in Iran as well as in the West. Talks soon resumed and started to take shape. The interim nuclear deal was signed within a few months which was considered as a credible breakthrough in the long drawn and largely inconclusive nuclear negotiations. This emboldened some to expect a comprehensive agreement between Iran and the P5+1 in the coming months.
However keeping in mind the issues to be resolved and with the deadline approaching, the enthusiasm and hope expressed by both the Iranian delegation led by the foreign minister Javad Zarif and the statements of US Secretary of State John Kerry about the likelihood of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on the nuclear program seems to be nothing more than a hollow promise. The probability in actual sense is less likely. A practical assessment of the current situation clearly highlights that a comprehensive deal will take some more time to take shape.
The United States is demanding that Iran significantly reduce its current enrichment capacity and maintain such restrictions for up to 20 years, while Tehran insists on building up much larger industrial-scale capacity within a few years.[1] Keeping in mind the above mentioned circumstances, it is clear that a comprehensive deal will not only involve a lot of technical inputs but also require more efforts on the negotiation table.
Without a doubt, sanctions avoidance ranks very high on the priority list of Iran and the temporary respite from sanctions which has helped its economy to revive is a strong impetus to stick to the dialogues approach. [2]
Negotiations have been going slow keeping in mind the technical and political (both domestic and international) hurdles involved in the negotiation process. However despite the challenges considerable gains have also been made on the issue.
A considerable amount of literature is available attempting to analyse the various approaches each side has resorted to and which has made the prospects of an extension of the interim nuclear deal more likely.
Good Cop- Bad Cop Approach
The American version of the good cop-bad cop approach is framed such that Israel plays the bad cop by threatening to bomb what it calls an "existential threat", as nuclear scientists are mysteriously murdered with Mossad efficiency, and a nuclear programme Iran insists is peaceful is sabotaged.[3] The US poses as good cop to the world, claiming that it is trying to rein in its ally. It claims to favour dialogue and negotiations i.e. peaceful resolution of the issue.
Iran on the other hand has its own version, with the strong conservative lobby and the Supreme Leader playing the bad cop by expressing skepticism that an agreement can be reached and by maintaining their traditional full-throated hostility toward Washington and the “moderate” Iranian leadership playing the good cop favouring a pragmatic approach towards the nuclear negotiations and dialogue with the West.[4]
Bargaining chips
In case of the West, respite from economic sanctions has been used as the bargaining chip against Iran. Whereas Tehran has capitalized on the Western difficulties in dealing with the turmoil in the West Asian region to gain some leverage in the negotiations and extracting some favourable concessions from the nuclear agreement as is evident from the statements of one of the Iranian official quoting "Iran is a very influential country in the region and can help in the fight against the ISIL (IS) terrorists, but it is a two-way street. You give something, you take something." [5] Thus both sides have their own lacunae which can only be filled by the other. Thus this duel also ends up in a draw.
The blame game
The hardliners in the US (mostly comprising the Jewish Lobby) who are opposed to making any significant concessions cast doubts on the Iranian commitment towards the deal as well as call for pressurizing Iran to completely suspend its nuclear program. The Iranians on the other hand tried to single out the US for its obsession with sanctions. The approach has hardly helped in the negotiations.
The way ahead
With a comprehensive deal nowhere in sight and suspension of talks not an option, an extension of the interim nuclear deal seems to be the only and the best alternative at the disposal of both parties involved. Solving the entire issue piecemeal has a host of advantages than going out for an all out resolution, which, keeping in mind the various complexities involved, seems highly unlikely.
Some of the advantages of a series of interim deals are as follows:
· This will allow both sides some more time to reach a compromise and settle for mutually agreeable terms, especially on very difficult issues like the suspicion surrounding the Arak nuclear reactor in the Iranian nuclear program.
· Mutual concessions reinforces the belief in negotiations thus defeats the purpose of deviating from the dialogue process - in short keeps the window for dialogue open.
· Phased sanctions relief will also provide for the international community to keep a check on Iranian compliance towards its commitments, at the same time provides some respite from the strangle hold of sanctions on the Iranian economy.
· Provides a face saver for both Rouhani in Iran and Obama in the US, and reinforces the belief of the local population in their leaders, thus earning them some political capital.
· Provides opportunities to employ confidence building measures, which can be instrumental in resolving outstanding differences other than the nuclear issue
Thus, even if a comprehensive agreement might take some time to materialize, the current pace of events with periodic extension of the interim nuclear deal and phased withdrawal of sanctions might serve the purpose better in the long run.
By Special Arrangement with The Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (http://www.claws.in)