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The Sinai Peninsula has been a haven for militants and illicit activity since Egypt lost the territory to Israel for more than a decade after the Six-Day War in 1967. The geographic location of the peninsula makes it more useful as a logistical hub for smuggling weapons and supplies than as a staging platform for attacks. Still, with the Egyptian military distracted by unrest in Cairo and other urban population centers, the vast, lightly populated and insecure desert region has seen an uptick in jihadist and militant attacks in recent years. Both Egypt and Israel, which shares a long land border with Sinai, have an interest in suppressing militancy in the area, but geographic and political constraints limit their ability to do so.
Since 1948, Sinai has served as either a buffer zone or a battlefield between Egypt and Israel. After Egypt's defeat in the Six-Day War, Israel occupied the peninsula until the 1979 peace treaty returned it to Egyptian control, albeit under conditions that limited the Egyptian military's presence in the area.
The most striking feature of Sinai is its physical isolation. The Gulf of Suez to the west separates the peninsula from mainland Egypt, while the Gulf of Aqaba to the east separates it from Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. To the north, Sinai borders the Mediterranean Sea. Throughout history, the peninsula has been a valuable route for overland trade between Asia and Africa, and its strategic significance has continued into the modern day with maritime trade after the construction of the Suez Canal.
Despite its position as the land bridge between the continents, the Sinai Peninsula's harsh terrain and lack of natural resources have left it relatively unpopulated and undeveloped. The northern part of Sinai consists of sand dunes and beaches, with its relatively flat and uniform terrain broken in some places by hills. The central region is made up of the lightly populated El Tih plateau, and toward the south are highlands consisting of granite and volcanic rocks. Sinai's small population lives primarily on the northern edge of the peninsula, along the Suez Canal and along the southern tip, including the popular tourist destination of Sharm el-Sheikh.
Militant activity in the Sinai Peninsula takes several forms. Because of Sinai's proximity to Gaza, Hamas and associated groups are active in the peninsula. These groups are heavily involved in smuggling goods, weapons and explosives into Gaza through a vast network of tunnels that connect the Palestinian territory to northeastern Sinai. The presence of Israel has also attracted transnational militant organizations such as al Qaeda affiliates and other Salafist-jihadist groups to Sinai.
Hamas does not allow unsanctioned jihadist activity in Gaza, forcing the transnational groups to find other points along the border from which to launch attacks against Israel. The groups are most active in Sinai's northeastern corner. To curb jihadist activity in Sinai, the Muslim Brotherhood-led Egyptian government has tried to set up talks with Salafist organizations in the region to bring them into the political mainstream. Cairo hopes to avoid having to crack down too heavily on anti-Israel militants and face a political backlash, both domestically and in the wider Islamic world.
In the Suez Canal region, militants belonging to jihadist groups based in mainland Egypt are active. However, the security issues raised by these militants are different from those posed by those active near the border with Israel. Suez-area militants operate there due to the proximity of their main target, the central government in Cairo, rather than Israel. Elsewhere in Sinai, Bedouin tribal militants are involved in smuggling, kidnapping for ransom and other illicit activity in the region. Local tribal organizations have extensive knowledge of the terrain and are often responsible for creating and managing the tunnels used in smuggling operations.
The Bedouin factions have long been neglected by the Egyptian government, and their poor economic conditions and history of militancy have made them useful assets for other players seeking to undermine the Egyptian-Israeli relationship by launching attacks in the Sinai Peninsula. Because most of the Bedouin population is unemployed, they are often willing to work for the highest bidder, whether that is an Egyptian security official requesting they keep watch over an area or a militant organization that needs the Bedouins to facilitate weapons smuggling or attacks against Israeli targets. This has forced the Egyptian government to accommodate the Sinai Bedouins by providing housing and bringing economic investment into the area.
Cracking down on Sinai militants would be a politically fraught proposition, but even if Cairo wished to take aggressive action, Egyptian security forces are largely constrained by the terms of the Camp David Accords. The agreement, which facilitated the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, limits the amount of forces Egypt can deploy in four zones, with those closest to the Israeli border the most demilitarized. Israel does, however, allow for ad hoc arrangements to be made permitting Egypt to deploy military forces toward the eastern Sinai, as Cairo did during Operation Eagle in 2012, in order to combat militant activity that threatens both countries.
Israel is in a difficult position regarding Sinai militancy. It does not want Egypt to normalize its military presence in the peninsula, but it also needs a strong enough Egyptian security force along the border to effectively prevent militant organizations from acting with impunity. Egypt's position is equally ambiguous. Apart from the need to keep the Suez Canal free from threats, Egypt must avoid angering sympathetic Islamist and Arab groups while still ensuring a level of security that keeps Israel from taking unilateral action in the peninsula.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)