Drone Strikes and the New Pakistani Government

Stratfor 2013-05-31

The reported death of a top Pakistani Taliban leader in a U.S. airstrike on May 29 could undermine the agenda of Pakistan's newly elected government before it even takes office. The attack occurred just days after U.S. President Barack Obama announced new restrictions on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, colloquially known as drones, and just weeks after Pakistan's May 11 general elections, in which voters overwhelmingly supported parties opposed to such strikes. If confirmed, the incident would weaken incoming Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's administration in negotiations with Pakistani jihadist groups, pose new domestic political challenges and further complicate relations with the Obama administration.

Wali-ur-Rehman, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's second-in-command to chief Hakeemullah Mehsud, was reportedly killed along with at least three other people after a drone fired two missiles at a house near Miranshah, the capital of Pakistan's tribal North Waziristan region, according to media reports quoting multiple unnamed Pakistani security sources. The Pakistani Taliban's official spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, would neither confirm nor deny the reports, according to wire services. There is no way to be certain right now that Wali-ur-Rehman is indeed dead, but if the reports are true, he would be the highest-ranking leader of the group to be killed since the 2009 death of its founder, Baitullah Mehsud, also in a drone strike.

Whether or not Wali-ur-Rehman was killed, the timing of the incident is notable. The targeted strike was the first in Pakistan by a U.S. drone in nearly three months, and the first since Obama outlined changes to U.S. drone policy in a May 23 speech. The revisions are largely the result of Washington's need to balance the short-term priority to eliminate threats posed by jihadists with the long-term need to avoid undermining the governments of the countries -- particularly Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan -- in which drone strikes are most often carried out.

In Pakistan, the drones issue is especially sensitive given that a new government -- led by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Sharif, who served two terms as prime minister in the 1990s -- is due to take office June 5. In the May 11 elections, the party netted 186 of 342 parliamentary seats, giving it a comfortable majority over the farther-right Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf -- led by cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan -- and President Asif Ali Zardari's Pakistan People's Party. Tehreek-i-Insaf also won a majority of seats in the provincial legislature of Pashtun-dominated Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, which is adjacent to the tribal belt, where most of the drone strikes take place. Both Sharif and Khan pledged to end the drone strikes, and both promised to negotiate with the Taliban to bring an end to the jihadist insurgency that has claimed the lives of as many as 40,000 Pakistanis over the past seven years. 

The May 29 drone strike complicates matters for Islamabad -- both domestically and in its relations with Washington. It is not in Washington's interest to create problems for a popularly elected government in Pakistan, especially since the United States needs a stable Islamabad to support the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and to help manage the country thereafter. Thus, it is unclear why the United States would risk exacerbating the challenges facing Islamabad with continued drone strikes targeting influential Taliban leaders. It is possible that Washington believed the political fallout from the attack would be a reasonable cost for eliminating such a high-ranking Taliban leader, especially one who is aligned with al Qaeda and whose group was responsible for the killing of seven CIA agents in eastern Afghanistan in 2010. It is also possible that the United States misunderstood the likely costs of the attack or even struck the wrong person altogether.

Sharif's Weakening Position
Regardless of who was killed, the attack has undermined Sharif's position. Considering his campaign promises to convince Washington to halt drone strikes in Pakistan, the prime minister-elect had hoped to benefit from the White House's new restrictions. Now, Sharif will need to demonstrate to the public that he will not  tolerate such strikes, especially since Imran Khan, his main rival, will seek to use the issue against the prime minister once he takes power and finds his options constrained by the realities of the office.

Beyond the domestic political arena, the attack could also impact Sharif's efforts to negotiate with the Taliban rebels, a process the prime minister has already begun by recruiting key Islamist figures as mediators. In the run-up to the elections, the Pakistani Taliban openly indicated a willingness to negotiate with Sharif. But the May 29 drone strike -- especially if Wali-ur-Rehman was indeed killed -- will force the group to revise its stance toward the incoming government and to lash out in retaliation. Sharif could blame the attack on the interim government, which issued a formal statement denouncing the strike, but the Taliban will nevertheless use the incident as leverage against the incoming administration.

In theory, the elimination of a top Pakistani Taliban leader should improve the Sharif government's bargaining position by weakening the jihadist group. However, Wali-ur-Rehman's death will likely have the opposite effect. The deputy leader is considered a relative moderate within the rebel movement -- especially compared to his boss, Hakeemullah, who engaged in a power struggle with Wali-ur-Rehman during the group's succession crisis in 2009. Wali-ur-Rehman's death would strengthen the group's hardliners, who have been hoping to exploit the relatively weak position of the incoming government, which has agreed to negotiations. The May 29 strike will allow the Pakistani Taliban to drive a hard bargain and only agree to a cease-fire if Islamabad can prevent Washington from conducting additional drone strikes -- a result the Pakistani state is unable to deliver. The jihadist group can also be expected to further complicate negotiations with a wave of fresh attacks to push the government further on the defensive.

Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)