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The killing of Wali-ur Rehman Mehsud, the deputy commander of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella group of militants active in the tribal areas of Pakistan, in a Drone attack early this week signals a US strategy to weaken the Taliban support base in Pakistan.
Rehman was involved in the attack on a CIA post in Afghanistan in 2009 and had a bounty of $5 million on his head. Rehman was closely aligned with the Haqqanis and other militant groups in the area which were brought together in 2009 by the Taliban chief, Mullah Omar, under the umbrella of Shura-e-Muraqbaha, to refocus their attention on targeting the ISAF forces in Afghanistan. A significant part of the Taliban's operational and financial capabilities are bolstered by groups operating out of the tribal areas in Pakistan.
The US targeting of Rehman at this juncture was also significant for other reasons. Rehman was a key TTP negotiator in the 'peace talks' with the Pakistan government. Rehman, accused of major attacks in Pakistan in the early years of TTP, had turned around to focus his attention on the ISAF troops in Afghanistan. He was against attacking Pakistan and its security forces and was keen on a negotiated ceasefire settlement which both the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban preferred so that a renewed offensive could be launched in the spring before the 2014 drawdown.
The US was, however, strongly opposed to Pakistan negotiating any settlement with the Taliban allies sheltered in the tribal areas. Mullah Nazir, who was considered as a 'good Taliban' by Pakistan Army, was killed in a Drone attack in November 2012. Nazir was an important member of the shura and close to the Haqqanis. There was considerable anger in Washington after it became known that Pakistan Army had secretly entered into a truce pact with militants in the tribal areas in January last year. Since then, the violence had dramatically reduced in Pakistan but attacks against the ISAF forces witnessed a sharp rise. There was a decline of 27% in the number of suicide bombings during 2012 in Pakistan. There was no decline in the Taliban attacks in Afghanistan during this period.
Rehman was reportedly killed in Miram Shah, the capital city North Waziristan which incidentally was known to be the operational base of the Haqqani Network. TTP operated out of Mir Ali, another major town east of Miram Shah. Rehman's presence in Miram Shah could be explained-he was a resident of the area and had close relations with the Haqqanis. In fact, he was a member of the Haqqani Network before joining TTP.
Rehman's death could prove to be a serious set back for TTP. This is the third second major strike on TTP's senior leadership since its formation in December 2007. TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a Drone attack in 2009. Qari Hussain Ahmad Mehsud, known as the trainer of suicide bombers, was killed in 2010. Rehman was not only the group's principal military strategist and the principle fund raiser but also a key interlocutor between the group and the Pakistan government.
In fact, his proximity to the military establishment became apparent last year when the army projected Wali-ur Rehman as the new leader of TTP. Media reports, quoting anonymous military sources, spoke about violent skirmishes between the supporters of Hakimullah and Wali-ur Rehman for leadership. Although it is not known how much of truth there is in the fallout between the two and the subsequent rapprochement (both appeared together in a video), there is little doubt that militants operating in the tribal areas harbour serious differences and have fought pitched battles for leadership and financial stakes.
The tug of war between Pakistan and TTP in the recent months also added to the suspicion that Pakistan Army was trying to divide the TTP leadership by seeking ceasefire in return for holding back any possible direct military action. TTP's earlier overtures were positive and were probably influenced by Rehman, a former member of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazlur (JUI-F), an influential religious group active in the tribal areas as well as the neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. JUI-F chief, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, a close ally of the Taliban, is part of the new government in Islamabad led by PMLN chief Nawaz Sharif. The Maulana is the designate-interlocutor for the new government in negotiating a peace settlement with TTP.
Rehman's death consolidates the position of Hakimullah and makes the possibility of any negotiations with the Pakistan government even more remote. There are already suspicions that Rehman's location could have been given away by Hakimullah's supporters. With Hakimullah refusing to give up targeting Pakistan, the army will be forced to, once again, take a call on launching a military offensive against TTP in Mir Ali. Will it do so in the near future? Most likely, no. This is not a challenge which either the new Prime Minister or the outgoing Army Chief will be willing to take, given its ramifications.
On the other hand, Pakistan could benefit from Rehman's killing as it TTP's operational capabilities were bound to be curtailed. Rehman was not only a key military strategist and planner but also a successful fund raiser. He was involved in some of the serious attacks inside Pakistan besides the 2009 attack on the CIA post in Khost in which seven CIA operatives were killed. A few months later, the US put a bounty of $5 million on Wali-ur Rehman. With Rehman out, TTP's operational reach and capability would be contained within the tribal areas. The killing also could trigger one or multiple splintering in the group, further weakening its capabilities. The possibility of the group or the splinter groups willing to come to the negotiating table, therefore, could not be discounted.
Although it is too early to make categorical assumptions about the US future strategy in dealing with the Taliban allies operating inside Pakistan, few conclusions can be drawn from the Rehman killing. One, the US will continue to pursue its Drone campaign against individuals and groups which pose serious threats to its interests in Afghanistan. Two, it will do so even if such action undermines the Pakistan establishment-both civilian and military. Three, targeting of other Taliban allies in the tribal areas will continue.
By Special Arrangement with : Observer Research Foundation (www.orfonline.org)