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Though afflicted with serious terrorism for over two decades, particularly since the attacks in Mumbai beginning November 26, 2008, India has struggled to put in place a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy. To that end, the government of India proposes the establishment of a National Counter Terrorism Centre, modelled along the lines of the American NCTC and Britain’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre.
According to the Union Home Ministry, The NCTC will derive its powers from the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967. It is to be a part of the Intelligence Bureau and will be headed by a Director who will report to the Director, IB and the Home Secretary. The NCTC will execute counter-terror operations and collect, collate and disseminate data on terrorism besides maintaining a data base on terrorists and their associates including their families. The NCTC has been empowered to analyse intelligence shared by agencies like the Intelligence Bureau and select what it deems suitable. It has also been granted powers to conduct searches and arrests in any part of India and will formulate responses to terror threats.
However, it is not functional yet because there is no consensus on how it will function because state governments feel it impinges on their autonomy to deal with law and order issues.
“The establishment of the NCTC is not a State versus Centre issue. The primary purpose behind setting up the NCTC is to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts throughout this vast country, as the Intelligence Bureau has been doing so far. The NCTC should be a vehicle of our combined efforts to reach the shared goal of curbing terrorism and eradicating militancy.
Terrorism is today one of the most potent threats to our national security. There can be no disagreement on putting in place an effective counter terrorism regime with efficient mechanisms and response systems both at the national level and at the State level. Neither the states nor the Centre can fulfill this task alone. The closest cooperation and coordination is therefore necessary to meet the threats that emanate from within and outside our borders.
Since 26/11, we have diligently strengthened our counter terrorism capabilities both in the States and at the Centre. I believe that today the State and Central Police and intelligence agencies are working in harmony and in close coordination. These efforts have resulted in several noteworthy successes.
On the whole there is broad agreement on the strategy and measures that we must adopt to counter terrorism in all its multifarious dimensions in India, including cross-border terrorism, Left Wing Extremism, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgency in the North-East and religion based terrorism. However, much remains to be done.
We have been providing financial assistance to the States and helping them train State police and intelligence agencies. We are also implementing schemes on border management and on coastal security, and the scheme for modernization of state police forces.”
(Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his address to Chief Ministers on establishment of the NCTC on May 5, 2012)
INDIA AND UNITED NATIONS
Counter-Terrorism
The 13 major UN instruments relating to specific terrorist activities remain fundamental tools in the fight against terrorism. India is a Party to all the 13 major legal instruments. We also attach utmost importance to the fulfilment of obligations under the relevant counter terrorism resolutions of the United Nations, namely Resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1540 of the UN Security Council. We have filed five National Reports with the Counter Terrorism Committee, giving a comprehensive picture of steps taken by India to counter terrorism.
In 1996, India presented a draft of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism (CCIT) to the Ad Hoc Committee of the UN General Assembly on International Terrorism. It is intended that the CCIT, when concluded, would provide the international community with a legal framework that can supplement the existing Conventions to comprehensively deal with terrorism.
India acknowledges the concerns of the member states in regard to outstanding issues, namely the importance of the need not to affect the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination; the need to capture concerns relating to “State terrorism”; resolution of matters concerning potential impunity of military forces; and the need to delineate activities to be covered by the scope of the convention and those covered by humanitarian instruments. At the same time, India is also of the view that such issues have to be sorted out at the earliest and that the CCIT cannot be held hostage to definitions while terrorists continue to take innocent lives.
India welcomed the adoption in 2006 of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy that recognizes the need to express solidarity with innocent victims of this scourge and specifically addresses victims of terrorism. We believe that the primary responsibility for implementing the Strategy rests on Member States and hope that the Strategy would provide the impetus to unite them in the fight against terrorism via practical measures that facilitate cooperation by way of extradition, prosecution, information exchange, and capacity building.
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act incorporates provisions that deal with all aspects of terrorism including incitement. The Act also criminalizes raising of funds for terrorist activities, holding of proceeds of terrorism, harboring of terrorists, unauthorized possession of any bomb, dynamite or hazardous explosive substance or other lethal weapon or substance capable of mass destruction or biological or chemical substance of warfare.
The necessary legal, regulatory and administrative framework for combating money laundering and financing of terrorism is also in place. The specific legislations to prevent financing of terrorism include: (a) Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, (b) Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 2003; and (c) Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2003 of 1967 as amended in 2004. A Financial Intelligence Unit-India is already in operation and is the nodal agency responsible for receiving, processing, analyzing and disseminating information relating to suspect financial transactions to intelligence and enforcement agencies.
India has not only adhered to the existing regulatory framework governing controls over weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery but has proceeded to strengthen these obligations by enacting an overarching and integrated legislation prohibiting unlawful activities in relation to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (The Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery System (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, in 2005).
Laws such as The Explosive Substances Act, 1908; The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; The Environment Protection Act, 1986; The Atomic Energy Act, 1962; The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992; The Customs Act, 1962 form the legal basis of India‟s system of export Controls. Various agencies of the Government are empowered to enforce the provisions of these laws.
India is Party to the International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters (Johannesburg Convention), aimed at enhancing cooperation among Customs Administration of various countries to ensure supply chain security; and the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (the Kyoto Convention) and has in place legislation and procedures to cover these Standards.
India is a Party to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. It provides for extradition of persons accused of terrorist activities within the SAARC member countries. To facilitate extradition in the absence of a bilateral agreement, the Indian Extradition Act, 1962 has provisions for treating an international convention as an extradition treaty to which India and a foreign State concerned are parties in respect of the offences dealt under that convention. In addition India has entered into bilateral extradition agreements with several countries.
India has a well developed law on mutual assistance in criminal matters which enables it to seek from and extend cooperation to foreign States in respect of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. India has concluded
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with 26 countries and 5 more Treaties are under negotiation. To ensure a greater sense of security within the South Asian region, recently at the Fifteenth Summit of the SAARC, a Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters was adopted which allows Member States to provide each other the greatest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters.
India has been working with its international partners and regional organizations to prevent and combat international terrorism. We have constituted Joint Working Groups with 25 States, and regional organizations like the EU and BIMSTEC, for coordinating and cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts. These Groups meet regularly, and have proved useful in providing a forum for exchange of information and experiences.
(United Nations website)
(India placed a COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION against INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (CCIT) in the United Nations in 1996, for adoption by the international community, but that continues to remain on the table (and has NOT been adopted yet) because there is NO CONSENSUS among all countries about the DEFINITION of terrorism. The Arab states and Palestine in particular have not agreed on a definition of terrorism.
The CCIT basically outlines India's counter-terrorism policy.)
India was on the UN Security Council for 2 years – 2011 and 2012 and has said it was ready with the text of the Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism and would press for its early adoption by the United Nations. However, there remain TWO outstanding issues that still needed to be resolved dealing with what kind of armed struggle, for instance a liberation movement, would not be called a terrorist act, and secondly would military forces be within the scope of the convention.
I am sending you piece below because B.Raman is an iconic figure on counter-terrorism policy, having helped to formulate a lot of the policy. This paper, though old and pre- Mumbai 26/11, outlines EVERY aspect of India's Counter-Terrorism policy. It also shows how we have faced terrorism decades before 26/11:--
COUNTER-TERRORISM: The Indian Experience
B. Raman
(Text of a presentation made by the writer at a regional seminar on March 25, 2003)
PREFACE
The S. E. Asian countries have been increasingly affected by pan-Islamic jihadi terrorism spawned in the madrasas and training camps of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Cadres of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayaaf of Southern Philippines had fought along with Pakistani jihadi and Afghan Mujahideen groups against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The links built up then have been sustained. The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) of Pakistan, which is a member of bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF), has been training the Abu Sayaaf and providing it with arms and ammunition.
HUM leaders claim that many HUM cadres fought against the Filippino security forces along with Abu Sayaaf and achieved "martyrdom" and are buried there. In 1998, Abu Sayaaf became a member of bin Laden's IIF. The Jemmah Islamiyah (JI), which has been co-ordinating pan-Islamic jihadi activities in S.E.Asia, is sought to be patterned after the IIF. It is believed to have many cadres of Afghan jihad vintage in its ranks and leadership. In the middle of last year, the total number of students from S.E.Asia studying in the pan-Islamic madrasas of Pakistan was estimated at about 400. Some of them had gone to Afghanistan and fought against the American troops in order to get jihadi experience.
The Pakistan branch of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) is very active in S.E. Asia, ostensibly to teach the Muslims of the region to be better Muslims, but it acts as the front organisation of the jihadi members of the IIF for recruiting local volunteers for training and for funnelling financial and other assistance. India has a good database on these organisations and their activities and has a valuable experience of dealing with them. Close inter-actions between the counter-terrorism agencies of India and the countries of the S.E. Asian region would, therefore, be of mutual benefit. This paper seeks to describe the Indian experience in dealing with religious and non-religious terrorism, highlight the lack of impact of bin Laden and his Al Qaeda on the Indian Muslim community, explain India's counter-terrorism set-up, policies and techniques and draw up a balance-sheet of results achieved.
THE TEXT OF THE PAPER
For the purpose of this paper, insurgency has been taken to mean an armed violent movement directed mainly against the security forces and other governmental targets and seeking territorial control and terrorism to mean an armed violent movement directed against governmental as well as non-governmental targets, involving pre-meditated attacks with arms and ammunition and explosives against civilians and resort to intimidatory methods such as hostage-taking, hijacking etc and not seeking territorial control. India has faced exclusively terrorist movements in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) bordering Pakistan and part insurgent-part terrorist movements in the North-East bordering Myanmar and Bangladesh, in Bihar bordering Nepal and in certain interior parts of the country such as Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa not having international borders.
2. India has also faced terrorism of an ephemeral nature, which sprang suddenly due to a fit of religious anger either against the Government or the majority Hindu community or both and petered out subsequently.
Examples of this would be the simultaneous explosions in Mumbai (Bombay) on March 12,1993, which killed about 250 civilians, and the simultaneous explosions in Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu in February,1998. The State of Tamil Nadu in the south had also faced in the past a fall-out of the terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka in the form of attacks by LTTE elements on its political rivals living in the State and the assassination of former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, at Chennai (Madras) in May,1991. India had also faced for some years Hindu sectarian terrorism in the form of the Anand Marg (meaning Road to Happiness), which in its motivation and irrationality, resembled to some extent the Aum Shinrikiyo of Japan. The Anand Marg, with its emphasis on meditation, special religious and spiritual practices and use of violence against its detractors, had as many followers in foreign countries as it had in India. Its over-ground activities have petered out since 1995, but it is believed to be still retaining many of its covert cells in different countries. However, they have not indulged in acts of violence recently.
3. Amongst the causes of the various insurgent/terrorist movements were the following:
* Political: Essentially in Assam and Tripura. The political factors , which led to insurgency-cum-terrorism were such as the failure of the Government to control the large-scale illegal immigration of Muslims from Bangladesh, demand for economic benefits for the sons and daughters of the soil etc.
* Economic: Mainly in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Bihar. The economic factors were such as the absence of land reforms, rural unemployment, exploitation of the landless labourers by the land-owners etc. These economic grievances and perceptions of gross social injustice have given rise to ideological terrorist groups such as the various Marxist/Maoist groups operating under different names.
* Ethnic: Mainly in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur due to feelings of ethnic separateness
* Religious: Mainly in Punjab before 1995 and in J&K since 1989. In Punjab, some Sikh elements belonging to different organisations took to terrorism to demand the creation of an independent State for the Sikhs called Khalistan. In J&K, Muslims belonging to different organisations took to terrorism for conflicting objectives.
Some such as the J&K Liberation Front (JKLF) want independence for the entire J&K, including all the territory presently part of India, Pakistan and China. Others such as the Hizbul Mujahideen want the J&K State of India to be merged with Pakistan. While those who want independence project their struggle as separatist and not religious, those wanting merger with Pakistan project it as a religious struggle. There have also been acts of religious terrorism of a sporadic nature in other parts of India. These are due to either feelings of anger amongst sections of the Muslim youth over the perceived failure of the Government to safeguard their lives and interests or due to the instigation of Pakistan in order to cause a religious polarisation.
4. The maximum number of terrorist incidents and deaths of innocent civilians have been due to religious terrorism. While the intensity of the violence caused by terrorism of a non-religious nature can be rated as low or medium, that of religious terrorism has been high or very high, involving the indiscriminate use of sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombers, killings with hand-held weapons of civilians belonging to the majority community and resort to methods such as hijacking, hostage-taking, blowing up of aircraft through IEDs etc.
5. * Non-religious terrorist groups of India do not believe in suicide terrorism, but the LTTE of Sri Lanka does. Of the religious terrorist groups, those of the Sikhs did not believe in suicide terrorism. The indigenous terrorist groups of J&K too do not believe in suicide terrorism, which is an unique characteristic of Pakistan's pan-Islamic jihadi groups operating in J&K and other parts of India. They too did not believe in suicide terrorism before 1998. They started resorting to suicide terrorism only after they joined Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) in 1998. There was no suicide terrorism in J&K before 1999. After they joined the IIF, there have been 46 incidents of suicide terrorism, of which 44 were carried out by the Pakistani supporters of bin Laden belonging to these organisations.
* The non-religious terrorist groups of India have not resorted to hijacking and blowing-up of aircraft. Of the religious terrorist groups, the Sikh groups were responsible for five hijackings, an indigenous Kashmiri group (the JKLF) for one and a Pakistani jihadi group (the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen-HUM), which is a member of the IIF, for one. The Babbar Khalsa, a Sikh terrorist group, blew up the Kanishka aircraft of Air India off the Irish coast in June 1985, killing nearly 200 passengers and made an unsuccessful attempt the same day to blow up another Air India plane originating from Tokyo. The IED prematurely exploded on the ground.
* All terrorist groups---religious as well as non-religious--- have resorted to hostage-taking for ransom and for achieving other demands. The non-religious terrorist groups have been targeting only Indians, whereas the religious terrorist groups target Indians as well as foreigners. The Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), a Sikh terrorist group, kidnapped a Romanian diplomat in New Delhi in 1991. An indigenous Kashmiri group (JKLF) kidnapped some Israeli tourists in J&K in 1992. The HUM, the Pakistani jihadi group aligned with Al Qaeda, kidnapped five Western tourists in 1995 under the name Al Faran and is believed to have killed four of them.
* None of the non-religious terrorist groups advocate the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of the religious groups, the Sikh ones and the indigenous Kashmiri terrorist groups did/do not advocate the acquisition and use of WMD either. However, the Pakistani pan-Islamic groups, which are members of the IIF and which operate in J&K, support bin Laden's advocacy of the right and religious obligation of Muslims to acquire and use WMD to protect their religion, if necessary.
* The Sikh terrorist groups did not cite their holy book as justifying the resort to terrorism, but the indigenous Kashmiri groups as well as the Pakistani jihadi groups operating in India cite the Holy Koran as providing justification for their jihad against the Govt. of India and the Hindus.
* The Sikh and the indigenous Kashmiri groups projected/project their objective as confined to their respective State, but the Pakistani pan-Islamic terrorist groups project their aim as extending to the whole of South Asia--namely the "liberation" of the Muslims in the whole of India and the ultimate formation of an Islamic Caliphate consisting of the "Muslim homelands" of India and Sri Lanka , Pakistan and Bangladesh.
* The Sikh and the indigenous Kashmiri terrorist organisations believed/believe in Western-style parliamentary democracy. The Pakistani jihadi organisations project Western-style parliamentary democracy as anti-Islam since it believes that sovereignty vests in people and not in God.
Linkages of indigenous Kashmiri organisations exist with the religious fundamentalist and jihadi organisations of Pakistan; linkages of organisations such as the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) with jihadi elements in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia; and the linkages of the Pakistani pan-Islamic jihadi organisations operating in India with bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
FUNDING
6. The following are the main sources of funding for the terrorist and insurgent groups:
* Clandestine contributions from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
* Contributions from the religious fundamentalist and pan-Islamic jihadi organisations in Pakistan.
* Contributions from ostensibly charity organisations in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
* Contributions from trans-national criminal groups such as the mafia group led by Dawood Ibrahim, who operates from Karachi in Pakistan.
* Extortions and ransom payments for releasing hostages.
* Collections---voluntary or forced--- from the people living in the area where they operate.
* Narcotics smuggling.
7. The funds are normally transmitted either through couriers or through the informal hawala channel. Rarely are funds transmitted through the formal banking channels.
SANCTUARIES
8. The main external sanctuaries of the terrorists are located in Pakistan and Bangladesh in respect of the religious organisations and in Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar in respect of the non-religious groups.
Since 1956, the Government of Pakistan has been using its sponsorship of and support to different terrorist groups operating in India as a strategic weapon to keep India preoccupied with internal security problems. Before the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, the then East Pakistan was the main sanctuary for the non-religious terrorist groups of India. Since 1971, the present Pakistan, called West Pakistan before 1971, has been the main sanctuary for all Sikh and Muslim terrorist groups. The Government of Pakistan has given sanctuary to 20 principal leaders of Sikh and Muslim terrorist groups, including hijackers of Indian aircraft, and trans-national crime groups colluding with terrorists.
TRAINING AND ARMS AND AMMUNITION
9. Pakistan has been the main source of training and arms and ammunition for the religious terrorist groups, which had operated in the Punjab in the past and which are operating presently in J&K and other parts of India.
The training is given by the ISI, either directly or through religious fundamentalist and pan-Islamic jihadi organisations, in various makeshift camps located in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Before September 11, 2001, the ISI had located the training camps of the Pakistani jihadi organisations, which are members of the IIF, in Afghan territory, but these have since been shifted to the POK and the Northern Areas. Five Pakistani jihadi organisations are members of bin Laden's IIF---the HUM, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). The first four operate in India. The LEJ, which is an antti-Shia organisation, operates only in Pakistan.
THE ROLE OF PAKISTANI MERCENARIES
10. Pakistan's ISI started infiltrating into J&K trained jihadi cadres of Pakistani pan-Islamic organisations, with experience of having fought against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s, for beefing up the indigenous organisations. Since 1999, the Pakistani jihadi organisations have taken over the leadership of the anti-Government of India movement and have been operating in Indian territory under the guise of Kashmiris. These Pakistani jihadi organisations project J&K as the gateway to India and say that after "liberating" J&K from the control of the Hindus, they would "liberate" the Muslims in other parts of India and set up two more independent "homelands" for Muslims---one in North and the other in South India. As part of this long-term aim, they have been setting up clandestine cells in other parts of India and launched some major operations such as the attack inside the Red Fort of Delhi in January 2001, the attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December, 2001, and the attack on Hindu worshippers in a temple in Gandhinagar in Gujarat in September, 2002. There have also been a number of terrorist incidents in other parts of India such as the attack on the security guards outside the US Consulate in Kolkata (Calcutta) in January, 2002, the four explosions in Mumbai in 2002-03, the latest on March 13, 2003, killing 12 innocent train passengers and the explosion in a Hindu religious place in Hyderabad last year.
THE ROLE OF AL QAEDA IN INDIA
11. Till now, Arab members of Al Qaeda have not operated in Indian territory. Some Arabs have been arrested in J&K during counter-terrorism operations, but they were members of Pakistani pan-Islamic jihadi organisations and not of Al Qaeda as such. However, the HUM, the HUJI, the LET and the JEM, the Pakistani jihadi organisations which are members of bin Laden's IIF along with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, have been responsible for the majority of the religious terrorist incidents in J&K and outside.
THE IMPACT OF BIN LADEN & AL QAEDA ON THE INDIAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY
12. India has a little over 140 million Muslims---the second largest Muslim community in the world after Indonesia. Only a very small section of the community has taken to terrorism due to various grievances and instigation by the ISI and the religious fundamentalist and jihadi organisations of Pakistan. The overwhelming majority of the Indian Muslims are loyal law-abiding citizens of India. They have not allowed their anger against the Indian Government or the Hindus for any reason to drive them into the arms of terrorist organisations. India has the most modern, peaceful and forward-looking Muslim community in the world. If one keeps J&K aside, the following factors are significant:
* During the 1980s, over 6,000 Muslims from different parts of the world went to Afghanistan to join the Afghan Mujahideen groups in their fight against the Soviet troops there. Not a single Indian Muslim went there.
* There are hundreds of Muslims from various parts of the world undergoing jihad training in the various madrasas of Pakistan. But there are no reports of a single Indian Muslim studying in the Pakistani madrasas.
* bin Laden's IIF has 13 members from different parts of the world---five of them from Pakistan. Not a single Indian Muslim organisation---not even from J&K---has joined it.
* When the US started its air strikes on Al Qaeda and the Taliban training camps in Afghan territory on October 7, 2001, there were demonstrations by Muslims in many parts of the world. There was hardly any demonstration in India.
* After the US-led coalition started its war on terrorism in Afghanistan, hundreds of Muslims from many countries went to Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the Taliban and Al Qaeda in their fight against the coalition troops.
Not a single Indian Muslim went there.
* The USA has been interrogating at its detention centres at Gauntanamo Bay in Cuba, Diego Garcia and Bagran in Afghanistan hundreds of Muslims from different countries caught in Afghanistan for helping Al Qaeda.
There is not a single Indian Muslim amongst them.
* As many foreign Muslims, if not more, come to India for their higher education as they go to Pakistan. Those studying in Pakistan go back to their countries as terrorists, narcotics smugglers or other law-breakers. There was only one instance of a Palestinian, who studied in India, taking to terrorism after he returned to his country in 1992. Foreign Muslim students studying in India go back to their countries as constructive citizens---bureaucrats, academics, IT experts etc. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, who is the toast of the world today for his courage, vision and modern outlook, is a product of the Indian education system.
13. These factors would show that, till now, bin Laden and his Al Qaeda have had little impact on the Muslim community in India. The Indian Muslims, including the aggrieved sections of the Kashmiris, have kept away from them. The attempts of the Pakistani pan-Islamic jihadi organisations to rally the support of the Indian Muslims in the name of bin Laden have not been successful so far.
INDIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES---DOMESTIC
14. India's counter-terrorism policies are based on the following principles:
* A genuine and well-functioning democracy, good governance, responsiveness to public grievances, effective policing and economic development are the best antidote to terrorism. India has not allowed the intimidatory violence of terrorism to come in the way of the electoral process. In the 1990s, elections were held in Punjab at the height of terrorist violence. Elections were held in J&K in September last year despite instructions from Pakistan's ISI to the Pakistani jihadis to disrupt the process. Foreign diplomatic missions in New Delhi were encouraged to send their observers to the State to satisfy themselves that the elections were free and fair. All of them have certified so. Elections to the Nagaland Assembly were held last month. The Government has not allowed the terrorists to disrupt the economic development of the affected areas. Even at the height of terrorism, Punjab continued to be the granary of India, producing a record wheat crop year after year. In J&K, the fall in revenue due to a decline in foreign tourist arrival has been sought to be made good by encouraging greater domestic tourism to that State.
In the 1990s, when the terrorists prevented the holding of examinations in Srinagar, the Government had the students flown to Jammu at its cost to take the examination. When they prevented businessmen from the rest of India from going to the valley to purchase their requirements of handicrafts and dry fruits, the Government had them and their producers flown to New Delhi at its cost to enable them to dispose of their stocks. The Government has announced many packages for the economic development of the affected areas and has been trying to implement them despite the terrorist violence.
* No concessions to terrorists resorting to intimidatory tactics such as hijacking, hostage-taking etc.
* No talks with terrorists unless they give up resort to violence.
* Search for a political solution through talks once the terrorists give up resort to violence. In the 1970s, a large section of the Naga hostiles and the Mizo National Front (MNF) gave up their resort to violence and entered into talks with the Government, which led to a political solution. A small section of the Nagas constituting the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) led by Isaac Swu and T. Muivah has, however, been holding on without reaching an agreement. However, it has been observing a cease-fire for the last two years and holding talks with the Government.
* The Government will have an open mind to suggestions coming from all sections of J&K for improving the political and administrative set-up there. In pursuance of this principle, the Government of India has recently appointed Mr. N.N.Vohra, former Home Secretary, to enter into a dialogue with all those elected during the elections in September last on their demand for greater autonomy for the State.
INDIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES---EXTERNAL
15. India has been the victim of Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism against it since the 1950s. In those years, Pakistan's ISI had been supporting the insurgent/terrorist groups in India's North-East and providing them sanctuaries, training and arms and ammunition in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of the then East Pakistan. India's anxiety to stop this played an important role in its assistance to the people of East Pakistan to liberate themselves. Since 1980, the ISI has been providing sanctuaries, training and arms and ammunition in Pakistan to the religious terrorist groups operating in Punjab, J&K and other parts of India and also infiltrating the mercenaries of the Pakistani pan-Islamic jihadi organisations into India to promote cross-border terrorism. Since 1992, India has been taking up this issue with the USA in order to have Pakistan declared as a state-sponsor of international terrorism under the US laws and punitive action taken against it. In 1993, the Clinton Administration in Washington DC placed Pakistan on a watch list of suspected State-sponsors of international terrorism for six months and forced the Government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif, then in power, to sack Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir, the then Director-General of the ISI, and other senior officers.
This did not have any effect on the use of terrorism by the ISI. Since 9/11, while Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment has been collaborating with the US in taking action against Al Qaeda elements posing a threat to US nationals and interests, it has not taken any action against cross-border terrorism directed against India and to remove the terrorist infrastructure in the POK and the Northern Areas. After the attack on the Indian Parliament in December, 2001, by terrorists belonging to the LET and the JEM, India mobilised its Army and deployed them on the border in response to public pressure for action against the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. In response to appeals from the US, the UK and other friendly Governments, India refrained from action against Pakistan. Under US pressure, Pakistan banned the LET and the JEM, but not the HUJI and the HUM and arrested some of their leaders and cadres. They have all been since released. Pakistan's assurances to the US that it would put a stop to cross-border terrorism in J&K have not been implemented. This is admitted by US officials themselves. Despite this, the US is reluctant to act against Pakistan because of its co-operative role in assisting the US in neutralising Al Qaeda elements who have taken shelter in Pakistan. India has made it clear that there would be no question of any talks with Pakistan on the normalisation of bilateral relations till it stops cross-border terrorism, winds up the terrorist infrastructure in its territory and gives up the use of terrorism as a weapon against India.
16. India has also been greatly concerned over the use of Bangladesh territory by the religious and non-religious terrorists operating against India. The non-religious terrorist groups continue to enjoy sanctuaries in the CHT.
Of the religious terrorist organisations, the HUJI has an active branch in Bangladesh. Some of the Al Qaeda elements, who escaped into Pakistan from Afghanistan, have found their way into Bangladesh, where they have been given shelter by the HUJI. There is active complicity between the ISI and its counterpart in Dhaka in this matter. The Bangladesh authorities have also not been co-operating with India in taking effective action against the large-scale illegal immigration into India. However, keping in view the otherwise good relations with Bangladesh, India has been trying to have these problems sorted out bilaterally at the political and diplomatic levels.
But, the progress achieved so far has been disappointing.
INDIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM SET-UP
17. India's counter-terrorism set-up consists of the following:
* The State Police and its intelligence set-up: Under India's federal Constitution, the responsibility for policing and maintenance of law and order is that of the States. The Central Government in New Delhi can only give them advice, financial, training and other assistance to strengthen their professional capabilities and share with them the intelligence collected by it. The responsibility for taking follow-up action on it is that of the State Police.
* The national intelligence community. This consists of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is the internal intelligence agency, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) of the Cabinet Secretariat, which is the external intelligence agency, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), which was set up a year ago, and the intelligence Directorates-General of the Armed Forces. The IB collects terrorism-related intelligence inside the country and the R&AW outside . The DIA and the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Armed Forces collect essentially tactical intelligence during their counter-terrorism operations in areas such as J&K, Nagaland, etc where they are deployed.
* The physical security agencies such as the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which is responsible for physical security at airports and sensitive establishments, the National Security Guards (NSG), which is a specially-trained intervention force to terminate terrorist situations such as hijacking, hostage-taking etc. and the Special Protection Group (SPG), which is responsible for the security of the Prime Minister and former Prime Ministers.
* The para-military forces such as the Central Reserve Police (CRP) and the Border Security Force (BSF), which assist the police in counter-terrorism operations when called upon to do so.
* The Army, whose assistance is sought as a last resort when the Police and the para-military forces are not able to cope with a terrorist situation. However, in J&K, in view of the large-scale infiltration into it from Pakistan and the presence and activities of a large number of Pakistani mercenaries, many of them ex-servicemen, the Army has a more active, permanent and leadership role in the counter-terrorism operations. What India has been facing in J&K is not just terrorism, but a proxy war being waged by the Pakistan Army through its jihadi surrogates.
18. In recent months, there have been two other additions to the counter-terrorism set-up:
* A multi-disciplinary centre on counter-terrorism in the IB headed by a senior officer of the IB. It is proposed to pattern it after the Counter-Terrorism Centre of the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In it, officers of the various agencies responsible for intelligence collection and counter-terrorism operations would work under a common umbrella. They would be responsible for a joint analysis of the intelligence flowing in from different agencies and co-ordinated follow-up action.
* A counter-terrorism division in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). It would be responsible for co-ordinating the diplomatic aspects of counter-terrorism such as briefing other countries on Pakistan's state-sponsorship of terrorism against India, processing requests for extradition and mutual legal assistance, servicing the work of the various joint working groups on counter-terrorism, which India has set up with a number of countries etc. It is expected to be patterned after the counter-terrorism division of the US State Department.
COUNTER-TERRORISM TECHNIQUES FOLLOWED BY INDIA
19. The techniques followed by India lay stress on the following:
* The importance of a good grievances detection, monitoring and redressal machinery so that the build-up of grievances in any community is detected in time and the political leadership alerted and advised to take prompt action to redress the grievances. The intelligence agencies have an important role to play as the eyes and ears of the government in different communities to detect feelings of anger and alienation, which need immediate attention by the political leadership.
* The importance of good preventive human intelligence (HUMINT). This is easier said than done because of the difficulties in penetrating terrorist organisations, particularly the religious kind.
* The importance of timely technical intelligence (TECHINT), which is generally more precise than HUMINT.
* The importance of objective and balanced analysis to avoid over-assessing the strength and capabilities of the terrorists which could lead to over-reaction by the counter-terrorism agencies, thereby aggravating the feelings of alienation of the affected community and driving more people into the arms of terrorists. Such analysis is particularly difficult in the case of HUMINT. For every genuine source, who gives correct intelligence, there are often two or three spurious sources, who give, out of greed to make more money or at the instance of the terrorists themselves, false information which tend to make the security forces over-react or take wrong action.
* The importance of reverse analysis so that one is trained to analyse possible scenarios not only as a good intelligence analyst would do, but also as an irrational terrorist would do.
* The importance of prompt and co-ordinated follow-up action on the well-assessed intelligence by all the agencies, without allowing inter-agency jealousies and rivalries to come in the way of effective action.
* The importance of effective physical security measures so that even if intelligence fails, the security agencies are able to prevent acts of terrorism.
* The importance of an effective crisis management apparatus so that if both intelligence and physical security fail, one is able to deal effectively with the resulting crisis or disaster.
* The importance of a good investigative machinery, specially trained to investigate terrorism-related cases.
* The importance of not over-projecting the personality and capabilities of terrorist leaders so that they do not become objects of lionisation in their community.
* The importance of underlining all the time to the public that just because some people of a particular community or religion have taken to terrorism, the entire community or religion should not be looked upon with suspicion.
* The importance of highlighting the positive aspects of the affected community or religion to prevent the build-up of a negative image of the community or religion in the eyes of the public.
* The importance of active interaction with the media to ensure that they do not make terrorist leaders appear like hero figures, and create a prejudice in the minds of the public about the affected community or religion and do not create problems for effective counter-terrorism operations.
* The importance of a well-designed psywar operation to project the terrorists for what they are, irrational killers.
* The importance of observing human rights during counter-terrorism operations.
* The importance of periodic refresher training of all those involved in counter-terrorism operations through special classes, seminars, opportunities for interactions with those who have distinguished themselves in counter-terrorism operations etc.
INTELLIGENCE-SHARING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
20. Even before 9/11, arrangements for intelligence-sharing on terrorism amongst the intelligence agencies of different countries existed. 9/11 brought in a realisation that terrorism is an absolute evil whatever be the cause and that unless the intelligence agencies of the world network themselves as effectively as the terrorist organisations, they might not be able to eradicate this menace. This has improved intelligence-sharing. India's success in bringing Sikh terrorism in Punjab under control before 9/11 might not have been possible but for the valuable intelligence inputs received by it from the agencies of many countries. Some of the significant successes in different countries against Al Qaeda were apparently made possible by increased intelligence-sharing without reservations. While this is welcome, one has to remember that political considerations peculiar to each country influence their perceptions of terrorism and this is bound to have an effect on intelligence-sharing. Hence, while continuing to benefit from increased intelligence-sharing, the important task of strengthening one's national intelligence collection capability should not be neglected.
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
21. Regional co-operation in the battle against terrorism has not been as successful in South Asia as it has been in the South-East Asian region. This is largely because of the Pakistan State's policy of using terrorism as a weapon to keep the Indian security forces bleeding and preoccupied with internal security duties and Bangladesh's tolerance of the activities of terrorists from its territory. Unless these two countries realise the folly of their policies and actions which have made their own territories playgrounds for terrorist groups of different hues and irrationalities, there is very little scope for any meanigful co-operation. India has been facing this problem of Pakistani State-sponsored terrorism for over 40 years and nearly 40,000 civilians and 3,500 members of the Security Forces have been killed.
This has not prevented India from becoming self-sufficient in agriculture, emerging as a major manufacturing country, developing educational, particularly technological, institutions of excellence the like of which no other Asian country has, becoming the leading information technology software power of the region and building up a foreign exchange reserve of US $ 72 billion, which, at this rate, should cross the US $ 100 billion mark in a couple of years. India can continue to fight Pakistan-sponsored terrorism for another 40 years and yet move forward on its path of development as a major power of the region.
On the contrary, Pakistan, because of its obsessive urge to keep India bleeding through terrorists by raising, arming, equipping and funding terrorists, has not had the required funds for educational and social development and for the economic advancement of its people. In its attempt to lift a big boulder and throw it at India, it is dropping it on its own feet.
RESULTS ACHIEVED BY INDIA
21. What are the results already achieved by India through its counter-terrorism policies and techniques?
* There is peace in Nagaland with a duly elected Government of Nagas promoting the economic development of the State. Only a small group of Nagas from the bordering areas of Manipur has not yet given up arms, but it is observing a ceasefire and negotiating with the Government.
* There has been peace in Mizoram for nearly 20 years now.
There has been peace in Punjab since 1995. However, Pakistan has not yet given up its efforts to re-kindle terrorism in Punjab through some terrorist leaders and hijackers given sanctuary in its territory.
* The Anand Marg has been dormant since 1995.
* As the economic and social development of the States affected by Maoist terrorism moves forward, the Marxist groups are bound to wither away.
* In J&K, the opposition has come to power after the elections of September last and is trying to reduce the alienation of the people and deal effectively with the Pakistani jihadis.
* The Indiam Muslim community, despite its feeling of hurt due to the large-scale anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat last year, has remained fiercely loyal and law-abiding and forward-looking and kept its distance from Al Qaeda and the IIF and repulsed the approaches of the Pakistani jihadi organisations aligned with Al Qaeda.
CAN S.E. ASIA BENEFIT FROM INDIA'S EXPERIENCE?
22. The S.E. Asian countries have been increasingly affected by pan-Islamic jihadi terrorism spawned in the madrasas and training camps of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Cadres of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayaaf of Southern Philippines had fought along with Pakistani jihadi and Afghan Mujahideen groups against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The links built up then have been sustained. The HUM of Pakistan, which is a member of bin Laden's IIF, has been training the Abu Sayaaf and providing it with arms and ammunition. HUM leaders claim that many HUM cadres fought against the Filippino security forces along with Abu Sayaaf and achieved "martyrdom" and are buried there. In 1998, Abu Sayaaf became a member of bin Laden's IIF. The Jemmah Islamiyah (JI), which has been co-ordinating pan-Islamic jihadi activities in S.E. Asia, is sought to be patterned after the IIF. It is believed to have many cadres of Afghan jihad vintage in its ranks and leadership. In the middle of last year, the total number of students from S.E. Asia studying in the pan-Islamic madrasas of Pakistan was estimated at about 400.
Some of them had gone to Afghanistan and fought against the American troops in order to get jihadi experience.
The Pakistan branch of the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) is very active in S.E. Asia, ostensibly to teach the Muslims of the region to be better Muslims, but it acts as the front organisation of the jihadi members of the IIF for recruiting local volunteers for training and for funnelling financial and other assistance. India has a good database on these organisations and their activities and has a valuable experience of dealing with them. Close inter-actions between the counter-terrorism agencies of India and the countries of the S. E. Asian region would, therefore, be of mutual benefit.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, Convenor, Advisory Committee, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Chennai Chapter, and author of over 300 articles on national security, terrorism, foreign policy and related subjects and of two books titled "Intelligence---Past,Present & Future" and " A Terrorist State As A Frontline Ally", both published by the Lancer Publications, New Delhi. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com)
(This is a piece I wrote outlining India's actions post 26/11.)
India sends Pakistan reminder of its "obligations"
IRGA
On the eve of the second anniversary of the Mumbai terrorist outrage that occurred on November 26, 2008, India has sent Pakistan a note verbale (or formal diplomatic letter) reminding Islamabad of its "obligations" in bringing the perpetrators of the carnage to justice. There has been negligible progress in the trial in Islamabad to bring seven Pakistani nationals accused of involvement in the Mumbai attacks. India has stalled a bilateral peace dialogue with Pakistan pending the accused perpetrators of the heinous act being brought to justice, and has said that it would not accept Islamabad's "terror - induced coercion" to return to the dialogue table.
The lone surviving gunman Ajmal Amir Kasab, caught shortly after he launched a killing spree in the city along with nine other Pakistanis, has filed an appeal in the High Court against the judgement of a fast track trial court verdict that held him guilty and sentenced him to death earlier this year.
Meanwhile, as part of its ongoing crackdown against Pakistan-based terror groups, US has slapped sanctions against more key Lashkar-e-Toiba leaders and its affiliates.
The senior LeT members who have been designated as global terrorists are Mian Abdullah, head of its Traders' Department, and Mohmmad Naushad Alam Khan, a key financial facilitator for the organisation.
Sanctions have also been slapped against Pakistan-based Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), which is closely connected to banned terrorist group LeT and also to its front Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD).
The LeT has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani, Indian and US interests and is responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks which killed 166 people. The group has also been associated with Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida network.
A senior leader of the LeT and current head of FIF, Hafiz Abdur Rauf, has also been designated as a global terrorist.
"Today's amendment of the LeT designation to include FIF shows that the United States will not tolerate any support to this organisation. LeT has attempted to use FIF as a way to evade scrutiny. This designation will help put to an end that attempted evasion," said the State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin.
"Few individuals are more integral to LeT's fundraising than Hafiz Abdur Rauf and Mian Abdullah," said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Stuart Levey.
"In their respective capacities, today's designees play key roles in advancing LeT's operations and soliciting financial support on its behalf.
"These actions will help stem the flow of finances to LeT through FIF and provide the Department of Justice with a critical tool to prosecute those who knowingly provide material support to LeT and its senior leaders," the State Department said.
The various actions taken today against FIF support the US effort to degrade the capabilities of LeT. We are determined to eliminate LeT's ability to carry out terror attacks and to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat its networks, it said.
Hafiz Abdur Rauf, a member of LeT's senior leadership since 1999, is the FIF chief.
The LeT has renamed itself as the FIF since mid-2009 to raise funds and evade international pressure following its involvement in the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.
In a message on the eve of 26/11, the United States Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer said, "The resolve and the resilience of the Indian people in the aftermath of those attacks stands in stark contrast to the savagery and brutality of the terrorists. As President Obama recently said in his remarks in India: Mumbai is -- and will be remembered as -- a symbol of the incredible optimism and energy that defines India in the 21st century. "
"Today, the United States and India are working together more closely than ever to keep our respective people safe. In July 2010, the U.S. and India signed an historic memorandum of understanding on counterterrorism cooperation that includes new collaboration in areas such as maritime security, forensics training, megacity policing, and a wide range of other areas of cooperation," Roemer said, referring to the close counter-terrorism cooperation that has made India better able two years since Mumbai to deal with and thwart such attacks.
Counter-terrorism: The Architecture of Failure
Ajai Sahni
The 26/11 attacks in Mumbai were, without doubt, a watershed event in India's experience of terrorism, and we appear to have become habituated, since, to measuring our responses, substantially, from this moment on.
This is, to some extent, natural and to be expected. The 26/11 incidents were one of the largest and most shocking of terrorist attacks in India, and the sheer drama of a 62 hour siege in full glare of the media is difficult to ignore. This was, many have arguably asserted, "our 9/11", and India's responses to Mumbai have repeatedly (and adversely) been compared to the US response to the catastrophic terrorist attacks in that country in 2001.
Such an orientation, however, fragments our concerns and responses, and pushes us into a derivative, reactive and poorly informed discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism (CT).
For one thing, the reality of terrorism in India is far more enduring and complex, and the threat will persist long into the future - sheer demographics, internal and external dynamics ensure this.1 To take the case of Mumbai alone, the city has experienced repeated Islamist terrorist attacks, including the country's worst terrorist outrage, in terms of fatalities, in the serial bombings of March 12, 1993. Terrorism in Mumbai did not start with the 26/11 attacks, nor - as the bombings of July 13, 2011, demonstrate - has it ended with them.
On a wider spectrum, India's experience with Pakistan-backed irregular warfare and terrorism (not to mention other patterns of insurgency and terrorism) goes back almost to the moment of the twin and troubled birth of these two countries. Over these long decades, we have experienced tremendous and humiliating debacles, and should not shy from conceding these - Mumbai 26/11 was certainly one. But we have also had dramatic successes. India's tragedy is that the lessons of both success and failure have largely been ignored and even lost. As noted elsewhere, India's political leadership remains entirely ignorant of the operational nuts and bolts of
our past counter-terrorism successes, and has chosen, instead, to rely on often dubious and inappropriate models of western 'successes', and on insubstantial political posturing. None of this has, or can, significantly diminish India's vulnerabilities to terrorist violence.2
What we have had is an overwhelmingly diversionary, politically opportunistic and misconceived emphasis on theatrical - but essentially unproductive - symbolism, with a persistent neglect of the imperatives of capacity building at the most critical levels of response.3
Unsurprisingly, despite vaunting claims of improvements to the system and unprecedented financial outlays to this end, in each year since 26/11, Union Home Minister (UHM) P. Chidambaram has found it necessary to concede, nevertheless, as he did most recently after the Delhi High Court bombings, that "all cities in India are vulnerable to attack".4
How can these positions - claims to huge and quantifiable improvements and admissions of unchanging vulnerability - be reconciled? Several factors, including, of course, the tremendous cumulative deficits of capacities in almost all structures of security and governance, have been responsible, but perspectives imposed by the inordinate focus on the 26/11 attacks have also been of significance.
It is useful in this context to recognize that Mumbai 26/11 was not a typical pattern of terrorist attack in India - though it was not unprecedented, particularly within the context of operations in Jammu & Kashmir. However, in its sheer spectacle, it has come to dominate our imagination and our concept of response, with images of incoherence and chaos. Thus, in the wake of 26/11, one commentator faulted "India's police and internal security system" which he characterized as "highly fragmented and often poorly coordinated."5
This perspective, indeed, has been echoed across principal streams of analysis of CT initiatives since. The protracted crisis of the 26/11 attacks, the pervasive sense of a loss of control, of a collapse of command, not just in
Mumbai, bu