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What exactly did the Bharatiya Janata Party mean when, in its manifesto released on April 7, it professed that it would “revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine “to make it relevant to challenges of current times?”
Did the BJP mean they would move away from India’s stated position of ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons, proclaimed shortly after India became an overt nuclear weapons power with the Pokhran tests of May 1998? Or was it just a suitable turn of phrase?
There has been considerable curiosity about what the party intends and immediately, analysts wondered whether the BJP was considering amending India’s declared ‘NFU’ position. After all, Pakistan has no such ‘NFU’ doctrine, so why should a potential BJP-led government, viewed as likely to adopt a “muscular” stance on India’s nuclear neighbours, hold back its hand?
Party spokesmen were quick to dispel such misgivings, saying that the manifesto outlined the party’s vision that India’s nuclear doctrine had to jell with the changing realities of the 21st century and that nuclear energy was a vital component of the country’s energy security.
In the manifesto, outlining an ‘Independent Strategic Nuclear Programme’ the BJP states that the strategic gains attained by India during the Vajpayee regime have been “frittered away” by the Congress and their emphasis would be “of a new thrust on framing policies that would serve India’s national interest in the 21st century.” The party would follow a “two-pronged, independent nuclear programme..for civilian and military purposes.”
The party would “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times” and “maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostatic realities.”
The language of the BJP's manifesto is fairly moderate and needs to be seen in the context of the failure of the UPA government to update India's nuclear doctrine and evolve a strategy which would integrate the country's conventional war-fighting potential with its nuclear weapons capability.
Analysts point out that India’s nuclear doctrine was formulated and spelt out during the NDA regime headed by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and thus unlikely to be radically amended.
According to strategic analyst P R Chari, “India’s ‘no-first-use’ policy owes, not to the Congress and UPA, but to the BJP party and NDA government that took the decision to conduct the nuclear tests in May 1998.” Then Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, declared that India would pursue a no-first-use policy in regard to employing nuclear weapons. This pledge was reiterated in the draft nuclear doctrine issued for public discussion in August 1999, and later incorporated into the decisions of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) promulgated in January 2003.
However, according to analysts, what India has is actually a ‘draft nuclear doctrine’ and not one that is “cast in stone.” The voluntary moratorium on testing and ‘NFU’ pledge were offered to overcome the condemnation and sanctions imposed by the international community, so the doctrine remains a “work in progress.”
“It is a much better idea to keep the opponent guessing than to reveal all our cards,” a senior official said, while commenting on the BJP’s manifesto, and the UPA government’s failure to present a comprehensive nuclear doctrine.
India’s draft doctrine says :
While committed to the goal of a nuclear weapon free, India, till the realisation of this goal, will possess nuclear weapons.
India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent.
India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.
But if it is attacked through nuclear weapons in its territory or on Indian forces anywhere, then its nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage to the aggressor.
The NFU pledge has gone through a lot of changes since it was first enunciated. A document titled "Evolution of India's nuclear policy," was tabled by Prime Minister Vajpayee when he first spoke to Parliament after the tests on May 27, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, speaking on a debate on foreign policy in the Lok Sabha, Vajpayee offered an unequivocal global NFU pledge, saying that India would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, and not be the first to use them against the nuclear weapons states.
However, the current version of "NFU" was outlined in April 2010 by National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon, who said that India's "NFU" pledge is only valid against non-nuclear weapon states. Therefore, Pakistan and China, and the other six nuclear weapons states, are excluded from what was originally a global Indian pledge. As Menon told the NDC, "The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament."
The allegations against the NFU are that it is a pacifist, idealist, Gandhian strategy that has no role to play in the modern context.
There is, however, little wrong with the NFU. It is more economical because you do not need to maintain too large an arsenal. In NFU mode, you need bombs that will destroy cities. In "war fighting" mode, you need very accurate weapons which can destroy the enemies hardened silos, as well as tactical nuclear weapons to take on his conventional capabilities.
However, since Pakistan has been regularly adding to its component of tactical nuclear weapons and miniaturised nuclear-capable warheads, and since it has targeted its nuclear deterrence solely against India, the “practical” argument for the more “muscular” foreign policy is to amend the NFU doctrine. After all, Pakistan has made no such commitment.
The BJP’s emphasis, outlined in the manifesto, is on projecting a “muscular” or “tough” regional policy: "where required we will not hesitate from taking strong stand and steps".
Bravado is not a substitute for a comprehensive neighbourhood strategy.
A year ago, the convener of the National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran, responding to questions on the development of small tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan, said that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but regardless of the size of the attack, Indian retaliation "will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary."
It would be prudent to recall that one of the reasons the Kargil conflict could not escalate was specifically because of India’s ‘no first use’ commitment. Also, China, which was the stated reason for India testing its nuclear arsenal in 1998, adopted the doctrine of NFU in 1964, after it tested at Lop Nor, a commitment it has retained till today.
Clearly, there are a host of issues that need to be thought through. India's nuclear doctrine and strategy cannot be static. Changes have been taking place in its neighbourhood and India must therefore adjust its own thinking on these issues.
But, any suggestions by the BJP for discarding the NFU must also, perforce, take into account the fact that abandoning the doctrine would place India on a par with Pakistan and not China.
Nilova Roy Chaudhury is Editor-in-Chief of the Indian Review of Global Affairs.