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The Indian nuclear doctrine clearly articulates a no first use strategy. This implies that India would not initiate a nuclear attack but would retaliate when subjected to one. This apparent ‘loss of initiative’ causes great angst, especially in some quarters of the military and the strategic community. The NFU is criticized for leaving India open to a nuclear strike and projecting the country as weak and passive. This, however, is a complete misreading of the NFU strategy.
Pakistan seeks to deter through a first use strategy. It projects a low nuclear threshold which suggests that it would use nuclear weapons if faced with a major conventional onslaught from India. This policy of brinkmanship raises uncertainty and cost of escalation for India, thereby forcing a certain caution on New Delhi. This has led to the impression that Pakistan’s first use deterrence doctrine has been more effective.
Such arguments, however, tend to overlook the actual incredibility of a first use strategy when it faces an adversary that has a secure second strike capability because then retaliation will have to be suffered too. In a nuclear dyad, first use is not just about one’s own use, but has to factor in a nuclear response too. Is it then useful, and more importantly, credible to threaten first use of nuclear weapons? Can/should Pakistan’s first use threat be taken seriously as long as India has the capability and resolve to inflict assured, punitive retaliation?
To take the analysis further, let’s examine two situations that are often considered worthy of nuclear first use. The first shows the dilemma of Pakistan and the second illustrates the dilemma India could face if it too chose to have a first use. In the first case, it is argued that if Pakistan were to face the prospect of conventional defeat, it would be left with no option but to use nuclear weapons. But, even in such a situation how does the country gain by using this weapon because once it has done so, its fate shifts from being defeated-now-but-living-to-fight-another-day to one of severe damage/annihilation. Jonathan Schell asked, “how can it make sense to “save” one’s country by blowing it to pieces? And what logic is there in staving off a limited defeat by bringing on unlimited, eternal defeat?” The choice rests with the first user.
Secondly, from India’s perspective, it is argued that first use would be justified, even necessary, if one was to learn that the adversary was preparing for a nuclear strike. In such case, nuclear pre-emption would be the right step. Really? Even preparation is no guarantee of a nuclear strike and may well be part of a strategy of “coercive diplomacy.” Therefore, despite the apparent show of readiness, there could be a chance that nuclear weapons are not used. But by striking first in the face of apparent readiness on the other side, India would end up inviting retaliation for certain.
In both the above examples, the folly of first use stands out because in neither case can the first user hope to come out looking better when the other side has a robust retaliatory capability. Hence despite having a first use strategy, in reality, nations cannot find it easy to execute it. In fact, to be credible, first use must be able to project an ability to fight a war of attrition and prevail.
This requires large arsenals of first strike weapons (such as accurate missiles with multiple independently retargetable vehicles), nuclear superiority to carry out counterforce attacks against adversary’s retaliatory forces, elaborate and delegated command and control structures to coordinate simultaneous nuclear attacks from and over dispersed forces. None of this is easy, or cheap, or even conducive for own safety. Rather, maintaining nuclear forces in a state of readiness for first use raises the possibility of an accidental nuclear war based on a miscalculation, or unauthorized launch.
On the other hand, an NFU concedes the onus of escalation to the adversary, an act that is actually liberating for both the military and the political leadership. The military need not perfect and sustain a strenuous C2 system that can easily fall prey to misadventure. Also, the political leadership is freed from the psychological pressure of making the difficult choice of when or how early to use the weapon, especially when it has to be done in the knowledge that retaliation can yet not be escaped. Can any rational leader live with the weight on his conscience of the nuclear annihilation that he caused? It may be worth remembering that the South Korean Prime minister has recently resigned taking moral responsibility for loss of 300 lives in a ferry incident.
Logic then points to the NFU as being far more sensible and credible. While a country would find it very difficult to use the weapon first, the decision of retaliation would be far easier, seemingly legitimate, and more guilt-free to make. In fact, by projecting assured retaliation, a nation displays greater confidence, and hence greater deterrence credibility.
An additional benefit of NFU is that it alleviates the adversary’s insecurity by relieving pressure on its leaders for launching a pre-emptive strike for fear that a nuclear strike was imminent. The NFU helps to mitigate the “use or lose” pressure and thereby lessens crisis instability since it sends a message that does not place the adversary on edge at all times. This tilts the balance in favour of nuclear weapons not coming into use at all, meeting thereby the objective of nuclear weapons, which is deterrence.
India has helped the cause of its own security by having an NFU and has rather put Pakistan in a quandary. Can it afford to use its weapons when retaliation from India will be massive and certain? Its first use strategy amounts to tilting at windmills. And ours would too, if we were to adopt a first use strategy. The NFU, on the other hand, reflects a quiet, calming confidence. But unfortunately, we in our own country have not understood the deep wisdom behind the NFU strategy.
By Special Arrangement with The Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (http://www.claws.in)