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On June 15, the Pakistan Army began a military operation in North Waziristan to “eliminate these terrorists regardless of hue and colour”. In the fortnight since operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ began, numerous airstrikes have been carried out, killing 370 militants as of June 30.
At this stage of the operation, the Army is carrying out door-to-door searches in the town of Miranshah, in North Waziristan. This town has been one of the main bases of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Between airstrikes, American drone strikes and ground forces, Zarb-e-Azb is the most major operation against religious extremists the Pakistan Army has conducted in years!
Analysts have speculated about the reason behind this sudden shift in policy. Some say that the Pakistan Army believes that it is critical to carry out this operation before the US withdraws at the end of 2014. Others argue that recent attacks have proven that the peace talks are a failure, and therefore the Army is finally taking action. Some have even said that the military leadership has wanted to carry out this operation for a while, and the civilian government is no longer able to rein them in.
Although all these have some merit, the underlying reason for the shift in policy is the shift in public opinion. Since Nawaz Sharif’s government came to power last year, there have been attacks in Quetta, Peshawar and against military convoys in North Waziristan. The Taliban attacks on the Karachi International Airport on June 8 are altogether different from prior attacks because they actually succeeded in shifting public sentiment past an unknown tipping point in favor of the military taking action against these extremists.
Moving in line with public opinion is not new for the Pakistani military, but many analysts have failed to grasp the extent to which the Army’s options for any given scenario only exist within the universe created by public opinion.
The Pakistani Army does not see itself only as a tool to protect its nation, but as a governing institution that may have to step into the role of governance at any moment. Due to this understanding of its own responsibilities to the country, the Army must have the people on their side at all times. The military is aware that a successful coup, and the ability to continue ruling, is dependent on the approval of the public.
Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has been under the rule of three different military governments. The first coup of General Ayub Khan in 1958 was met with general public approval, creating a precedent for the Pakistan military to take over whenever it felt it necessary. The later military coups of Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf were able to lean on this precedent when carrying out their own coups.
In 2007, when the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) incident took place, President Musharraf was already unpopular with his firing of the Chief Justice. Since Musharraf was unpopular, the operation to root out the heavily armed extremists in the Red Mosque was seen as being questionable. I remember being in Pakistan at the time, and being a part of conversations where people were expressing their doubts as to the validity of the military’s actions.
These extremists had practically turned a mosque in the middle of Islamabad into a fortress. The military had no other choice, and yet Musharraf’s unpopularity at the time made people question even this course action. Arguably, the Lal Masjid incident was the beginning of the end of Pervez Musharraf’s reign. The lesson Pakistan’s military took away from this incident is that military operations that are unpopular will lead to the downfall of its leaders, and hinder the Army’s ability to lead.
In 2009, the Taliban took control of the entire Swat region and hundreds of thousands of people fled to escape the harsh rule of the extremist group. Yet, the Army did nothing of note for months. Then, a video of a young girl being brutally caned went viral, and the whole of Pakistan became outraged. It was this dramatic change in public sentiment that allowed the Pakistan Army to carry out a major operation to root out the Taliban in Swat.
While military policy is not dictated by the sways of public opinion polls, the options available to them exist only in the realm of what the people of Pakistan will approve of. As a result, if the United States wants to influence the actions of the Pakistani military, they need to keep their thumb on the pulse of public sentiment in Pakistan.
Similarly, if India and the rest of the world would like to predict and understand what actions the Pakistan Army will take, keeping an eye on public opinion will be a critical component of their analyses.
By Special Arrangement with : South Asia Monitor (http://www.southasiamonitor.org)