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India’s new National Security Advisor Ajit Doval speaking at the Munich Security Conference in New Delhi on Oct 21 articulated the key shift in India’s national security policy under the Narendra Modi government.
Doval pointed out that India seeks to build an “effective and credible deterrence” to protect its security and territorial interests. This constitutes a subtle but determined shift from the conventional Indian position of sticking to “credible minimum deterrence”. Doval has removed the term “minimum” and substituted it with “effective”.
This is a welcome step keeping in view the Pakistani standard behavioral pattern during tense phases with India stemming from Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a state policy, its policy of nuclear blackmail and its speedily expanding tactical nuclear weapons programme. However, the new doctrine of effective deterrence is not limited to “nuclear deterrence” alone. This is evident from the strong military response by India to recent Pakistani ceasefire violations.
But this new doctrine will have to meet the challenge of future Pakistani escalation, which is most likely to come through actions of Pakistan-sponsored terror groups with low plausible deniability quotient and aimed at maximum collateral damage so as to pressurize the Modi government to give concessions and obliterate the red lines it has drawn regarding talks with Pakistan. This threat becomes more real in light of the fact that Pakistan is now getting extremely cold response on the Jammu and Kashmir issue in international forums like United Nations.
To meet this challenge the effective deterrence principle needs to be highly calibrated and nuanced, encompassing our broader strategic as well as tactical approach in tackling Pakistan in the long term.
Managing the Collateral Damage
The plausible deniability quotient of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack was deliberately kept low by Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment. They wanted it to be easily traced back to Pakistan; as the underlying aim was to secure concessions from US in the final Afghanistan settlement and pressurizing the then Indian government to dilute its position on various issues by injuring its popularity at home through pre-emptive nuclear blackmail. The strategy yielded benefits when in 2009 the Manmohan Singh government accepted the “Balochistan reference” in the Sharm-al-Sheikh Joint Statement and was forced to adopt peace at all costs policy.
So it becomes very necessary to manage the political damage and popular backlash resulting from Pakistan-sponsored terrorist carnages. This requires close cooperation between government and media in the larger national interest. Additionally, the Indian government shall inform the public about retaliatory measures it is taking in such a situation. Public must feel that retributive justice is being done. Modi government was very right when it informed the Indian public about the details of damage on the Pakistani side as a result of strong Indian response to recent ceasefire violations by Pakistan.
Inflicting back the collateral damage
The Pakistan army has espoused to itself the role of protecting Pakistan and is largely seen by Pakistani public as a capable security force despite the fact that it has never been able to win a war. This popular image of the Pakistan army suffered a blot when the US successfully eliminated Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad Cantonment and this setback was one of the key factors which allowed the first power transition from one elected government to another in Pakistan’s history.
So every escalation by Pakistan Army needs to be seen as a strategic opportunity to injure its popular image of capable protector of Pakistan. It is the highest cost that may be attached to the Pakistan Army’s support to proxy war against India. There must not only be a cost for support of terrorism against India but a spontaneous and visible cost creating a popular backlash against advocates of proxy war against India.
Being in control of Escalation
However, walking into a major war with Pakistan is not in our interests. Pakistan is largely a militant and mercenary state trying to discover its international utility through nuisance it can create while India is now on path to glory and prowess. Once the collateral damage is visibly returned we should know the art of quick retreat. That is something Prime Minister Modi must have had in mind when he told the Combined Commanders’ Conference that in future “full scale wars may become rare but force will remain an instrument of deterrence and influencing behavior, and the duration of conflicts will be shorter”. So, for effective deterrence against Pakistan what we should prepare for is retributive battle or action as contrasted with conventional war.
Such actions not only have great potential of becoming symbol of cost attached to sponsoring terrorism against India but will also give us the upper hand in psychological warfare. However, for such retribution to be effective it must be spontaneous and highly concentrated. During Operation Parakram in 2001 some such actions were taken by India but failed to leave any impression as they were spread over a long time span and vast border.
Foiling the nuclear bluff
In wake of the slightest Indian retaliatory action, Pakistan starts to raise the bogey of nuclear war and inviting international intervention. In a recent Pakistan National Assembly debate over Indian retaliation the main theme was that this could result in a nuclear war.
This is laughable and absurd as that is not how nuclear wars happen. The escalation passes through stages and not every military skirmish can trigger nuclear war. Pakistani generals have enough professionalism to understand this. Symbolic retributive counter-terrorism action where India does not attempt to make territorial gains cannot lead to nuclear war. We need to explain this clearly to the international community.
The higher direction of our policy needs to be aimed at demonstrating to Pakistan’s Military-Intelligence establishment that proxy war against India is as futile and damaging for its own interests and image inside Pakistan as is direct confrontation with India.
By Special Arrangement with : South Asia Monitor (http://www.southasiamonitor.org)