Seleka rebels in the Central African Republic have taken control of the government in Bangui. On March 24, the rebels overran the presidential palace, deposed President Francois Bozize and replaced him with rebel leader Michel Djotodia. Because the Seleka movement consists of several rebel militias, any government that takes shape could fall victim to the various ideological and personal agendas of its member groups. Now that the rebels have access to state resources, they could be better positioned to help their allies in the region, most notably in Chad, where a similar rebellion -- if properly supported -- could threaten the Chadian government in the future.
In August 2012, disparate militia groups operating in the Central African Republic united to overthrow the Bozize regime, which came to power through a coup in 2003. These militias include the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace and the Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention. Most group members are veterans of previous conflicts but had never fought together. They began their campaign in December 2012.
The Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention signed a peace agreement with Bozize's government in 2007, but the group resumed efforts to topple the regime when Djotodia and other leaders returned from exile in Chad and Sudan, where they found support from militias rebelling against the own countries. (A 2010 peace accord between Chad and Sudan severed external support for these rebels, effectively ending their capability to threaten their governments. While these rebels were not defeated, they continued to exist in smaller groups.)
After the December campaign began, Bozize called on France and Chad to commit forces to intervene. Preoccupied with the intervention in Mali, Paris declined. Chad committed some 600 soldiers, but they only fought limited skirmishes and eventually withdrew with Economic Community of Central African States peacekeepers.
In January, rebel leaders and Central African Republic government officials signed a cease-fire in Libreville, Gabon. One condition of the agreement was that the rebels would be represented in the government. The agreement held for just two months before the Seleka rebels resumed their campaign after claiming their demands had not been met. They reached Bangui on March 23 and took over the presidential palace the next day.
No Intervention
In previous rebel campaigns, Bozize relied on other states, usually France or Chad, to defend Bangui. This time, however, neither Paris nor Ndjamena has answered his calls to action, possibly due to his inability to accomplish the requirements of the 2007 peace agreement. France has remained an interested observer but does not want to intervene in or control what it has deemed a domestic dispute.
Despite a new power in Bangui, the Central African Republic is not likely to undergo dramatic changes. The rebels announced that they would organize general elections to establish a new government, but the preliminary deadline for these elections is in 2016, when Bozize's term was scheduled to end. It is likely that the rebels will install themselves in government positions, but they will have little ability or interest in governing beyond the capital. Moreover, ideological and personal differences among the Seleka alliance could threaten the unity of the group and, in turn, the stability of the government.
Notably, rebels groups outside the Central African Republic could benefit from the Seleka movement's newfound access to state resources. The relationship between the Seleka alliance and Chadian and Sudanese militias is well established; they have worked together in the past, and could certainly continue to cooperate. Chadian rebel leader Timane Erdimi recently said his rebel group would resume its fight against the government in Ndjamena. Having an ally in Bangui would only help his group's efforts.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)