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Security operations by the Somali military and international peacekeeping operations in Mogadishu have enabled the country's young government to expand control of the capital in recent months. The tempo of major attacks by hard-line Islamist militia al Shabaab has slowed considerably since the beginning of 2013, indicating a modest decline in the group's capabilities, and none of the group's recent operations have disrupted government activities significantly in Mogadishu or caused a strategic shift in peacekeeping operations.
However, al Shabaab still poses a threat to conduct guerrilla-style hit-and-run assaults in the capital. While the government has established high-security zones around key facilities in the city, the militants have found success with elaborate, manpower-intensive attacks on softer targets in recent months. Thus, al Shabaab will seek to concentrate its limited resources by organizing fewer yet more complicated operations that exploit the security vulnerabilities still widespread in Mogadishu.
In al Shabaab's most recent attack, on June 19, the group targeted a U.N. Development Program compound near Mogadishu's international airport. Militants managed to breach security measures on the compound's perimeter and engage security forces inside in a firefight lasting more than an hour. In April, al Shabaab staged a similar attack on the city's main courthouse compound, where the group used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in combination with suicide bombers and gunmen. These types of attacks require more manpower than bombings of government convoys and hardened facilities in Mogadishu conducted by al Shabaab in the past. But attacks on soft targets can still delegitimize the Somali government in the eyes of many Somalis and, most important, further al Shabaab's recruiting efforts.
Since withdrawing from Mogadishu in August 2012, al Shabaab has suffered territorial losses throughout southern and central Somalia. The group was pushed out of the strategic port city of Kismayo in September 2012, diminishing its control to several small pockets of territory and shrinking its pool of possible recruits. Retaking and holding lost territory would require considerably more resources than are needed for guerrilla-style attacks, which al Shabaab has used successfully to undermine the authority of the fledgling Somali government since it took power in 2012.
Though the rate of al Shabaab operations has dropped since the beginning of the year, in the final months of 2012, after the Kenyan capture of Kismayo, the tempo of attacks increased, especially in central Somalia and Mogadishu. The group has evidently been unable to sustain this pattern of operations, likely due to restraints imposed upon it by the loss of territory and access to external suppliers. Nonetheless, the attacks have hindered the central government's ability to expand its presence outside the capital.
Security Successes
Despite the attacks, the Somali government says it has improved security in Mogadishu, and African Union peacekeeping forces and Somali security claim to have thwarted several other operations by al Shabaab. There is at least some truth to such claims: Somali security services issued warnings shortly before the June 19 attack and the courthouse assault in April, indicating their ability to detect and track preparations for major al Shabaab operations in Mogadishu -- even if they were unable to prevent them from being executed. And attacks have indeed become more infrequent. The ability of authorities to mitigate the effects of al Shabaab's attacks is likely another reason for the group's tactical shift.
The type of facilities al Shabaab is now targeting -- facilities such as U.N. compounds and the Mogadishu courthouse -- are relatively softer targets typically guarded by less effective private security forces or the Somali police. By comparison, the Somali military and African Union peacekeepers have largely prevented militants from penetrating security layers at more critical government installations. This has led to a concentration of critical facilities inside a handful of high-security locations.
For example, Villa Somalia, a complex that houses the presidential palace, now also serves as a base for parts of Somalia's intelligence apparatus and the military's special operations forces. The largest secure complex in Mogadishu is the international airport, which is protected by African Union forces. In a manner similar to Mogadishu's seaport, the airport functions as an important logistical artery for security forces. The large complex also hosts private contractors, U.N. compounds and the makeshift embassies of Turkey and the United Kingdom. The military has also established positions along routes leading from the airport to the presidential palace, the seaport and various government ministries around the center of the city.
The establishment of protected areas at the airport and the presidential palace has also helped boost security somewhat in their vicinities, leading to a clustering of relatively soft targets -- such as compounds of nongovernmental organizations, hotels, guesthouses and restaurants frequented by foreigners -- around military installations. The United Nations, for example, continues to operate a facility located in a hotel, nicknamed "the Peace Hotel," right outside the gates of the airport complex. While such establishments typically hire their own security guards, their locations are chosen in hopes that the proximity of the military forces will help deter al Shabaab attacks -- or at least limit the casualties and damage they cause.
Remaining Vulnerabilities
However, while these outposts have given security forces high visibility in central Mogadishu, they have not necessarily improved their ability to prevent al Shabaab from operating in the capital altogether -- essentially an impossible task. The militants still have logistical support networks and sanctuaries in and around the city, and the limited footprint of security forces means the group can easily conduct hit-and-run attacks along routes unimpeded by security forces. Moreover, the June 19 attack on the U.N. compound took place right outside the airport complex, highlighting the threat still posed by al Shabaab on less valuable targets for which the resource-poor government has yet to provide strong military protection. (The attack encouraged the United Nations to move all its facilities except the Peace Hotel inside the airport complex.) Indeed, since al Shabaab is proving incapable of effectively attacking critical facilities, second-tier targets have become especially vulnerable.
Another ongoing security concern in Mogadishu is the efficacy of Somali security forces. Despite its limited successes in 2013 and recent improvement made by certain training initiatives, the military is still largely underequipped and poorly trained. The European Union Training Mission, for example, has been working with Somali troops since January 2010, but only a small number of Somali troops have gone through the program.
One noteworthy success for the Somali government has been the special operations force known as the Alpha Group, a well-equipped unit professionally trained by foreign contractors. The squad mainly performs counterterrorism operations, including several large-scale ones where the group shut down entire sections of the city while performing house-to-house searches for al Shabaab militants. The unit reflects limited optimism about the development of Somalia's security capabilities, but the government cannot yet instill this type of professionalism in the majority of the country's security forces. In the meantime, even if al Shabaab's tactics shift, the militant threat in Mogadishu will persist.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)