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The Nigerian government has reached an understanding that will lead to a cease-fire with Boko Haram, Nigerian Minister of Special Duties Al Haji Tanimu Turaki announced July 8. It was not clear if the cease-fire would be just for the month of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month that began this week, or if it is intended to be longer lasting. It is also unclear exactly whom in Boko Haram the government is negotiating with.
Nigeria has sought to broker a cease-fire with Boko Haram for several months while simultaneously waging an aggressive campaign to weaken the group's military capabilities. In the past, some Boko Haram leaders have expressed a willingness to negotiate with the government only to be killed by more radical members of the group. In late January, reports emerged of a local official's having negotiated a cease-fire with Boko Haram, only to have bombing attacks break that truce the following day.
The reality of the situation is such that even if Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau agreed to a truce with the Nigerian government, the complex nature of Islamist militancy in northern Nigeria means such an agreement would not completely end the region's pervasive violence.
The Militant Environment
As we have noted in previous analyses, Boko Haram was established in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria's Borno state, but it has since spread to several other northern and central Nigerian states. Its official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'asati wal-Jihad, Arabic for "Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad." While Boko Haram is only a little more than a decade old, it is important to recognize that Nigeria has struggled with militant Islamism for decades. For example, the Maitatsine sect led by Mohammed Marwa fomented violence in the early 1980s across much of northern Nigeria.
While Boko Haram is currently the largest militant organization in northern Nigeria, it is not the only one -- nor is it a monolithic organization. Like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, it consists of assorted cells led by individual commanders, and some of those commanders can at times be at odds with Boko Haram's central leadership when it comes to tactics and ideology.
Following the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009, Boko Haram experienced internal tensions between more nationalist factions aligned with current Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau and factions with a more transnationalist focus led by commanders such as Abu Muhammed and Khalid al-Barnawi.
It is believed that these tensions and an attack by Boko Haram on the predominantly Muslim city of Kano led to the January 2012 formation of a Boko Haram splinter group called Ansaru. Ansaru is short for Jama'atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan, which in Arabic means "Group for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa." It is believed al-Barnawi leads Ansaru, though this remains unclear. The self-proclaimed leader uses the name Abu Usmatul al-Ansari, a former Boko Haram leader in Nigeria's northeastern states. Many experts believe this is a pseudonym used by al-Barnawi.
In addition, both al-Barnawi and Ansaru are connected to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In June 2012, the U.S. government designated al-Barnawi as a global terrorist due to his ties to Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It is believed that al-Barnawi worked with Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who has since split from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to form his own Sahel-based militant group known as "Those Who Sign in Blood."
Jacob Zenn recently wrote an article in the Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel suggesting Ansaru is either working with, or has perhaps even re-integrated into, Boko Haram following the French military intervention in Mali that resulted in the scattering of many jihadist elements that had established a presence in the region. This is certainly possible. At the very least, an intricate web of relationships between the members of Boko Haram and Ansaru remains. But it is far from certain that a cease-fire with Boko Haram would extend to Ansaru, and if it did, it would be unlikely to stop Ansaru from continuing its kidnapping operations.
Any negotiations with Boko Haram will be complicated by more than just the fractious nature of the group. Rather than being merely focused on spreading Islamist tenets, the group also serves as a political tool. Powerful Muslim politicians in Nigeria's north use Boko Haram to pressure the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan in an effort to gain a larger share of the political patronage funded by Nigeria's oil revenues. Southern politicians such as Jonathan use militant groups in the Niger Delta for the same purpose. Northern politicians will also use Boko Haram's activities as cover for their own political assassinations. Direct links between prominent ethnic Kanuri politicians and Boko Haram leaders have come to light. At the very least, the 2015 presidential elections will provide significant motivation for the northeastern political elite to deploy its tool, just as Niger Delta militants such as Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force have threatened violence should Jonathan's re-election bid be thwarted.
A Complex Mosaic of Violence
It is also very important to recognize that Boko Haram and Ansaru are not responsible for all the violence in northern Nigeria. Most of the violence in some northern middle-belt cities such as Jos in Plateau state results from clashes between ethnic groups -- such as the Muslim Fulani and the Christian Berom -- over land and cattle. These clashes are also about securing political offices and patronage, and ethnic and religious identities provide much of the "us-versus-them" motivation to win these lucrative battles.
Beyond that, many "Boko Haram" attacks in northern Nigeria are conducted by self-professed grassroots militants, or even Muslim street gangs and hooligans, who are not formally connected with Boko Haram. Some of these local militants may subscribe to some of Boko Haram's ideology, but they tend to be more locally focused and motivated. Some of these militants are not even aligned with Boko Haram ideologically, yet the police or the media blame their attacks on Boko Haram merely because the attackers were Muslims or for some other propaganda purpose.
Such mischaracterizations make it very difficult to understand the complex mosaic of actors responsible for the violence in northern Nigeria. This complexity will make it very difficult to end the violence in northern Nigeria simply by negotiating a cease-fire with Abubakar Shekau or some other prominent Boko Haram commander.
But beyond that, there has been little progress made toward addressing the very real social grievances and economic problems that plague northern Nigeria and that lead many young men toward crime and militancy, and even toward joining groups such as Boko Haram as a source of employment. Until these grievances are resolved -- and considering the lack of meaningful economic opportunities apart from political patronage, they are unlikely to be -- Boko Haram and Ansaru will have a ready supply of recruits. This means that there will be very little chance of a meaningful, long-lasting peace settlement in northern Nigeria.
Finally, it is important to keep the threat posed by Boko Haram and Ansaru in perspective. While these militant groups will continue to operate for the foreseeable future, we have not seen indications that either group has been able to significantly expand its operational capabilities. They are still primarily limited to conducting attacks and kidnapping operations against soft targets, mostly in their core areas. This means that while they are able to attack targets such as schools and churches, they do not pose an existential threat to the Nigerian government. They have also not shown much ability to date to reach farther south than Abuja other than a single prison break, and their last large attack in Abuja was a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack against a newspaper in April 2012.
We have also seen no real signs of them becoming a transnational threat to the West along the lines of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Before they could develop such a capability, we would expect to see signs of them being able to expand their operational range to strategic places in Nigeria such as Lagos and Port Harcourt. There have been reports of Boko Haram activity in those areas, but so far the group has been unable to conduct successful attacks there. It remains a deadly but limited organization.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)