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The M23 rebel group ended its rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's eastern province of North Kivu on Nov. 4. Leaders of the rebel group declared an end to the fighting after Congolese forces, backed by elements of a U.N. intervention brigade, assaulted the last remaining M23 positions along the Ugandan border.
Key rebel leaders, including military chief Sultani Makenga, reportedly fled across the border into Uganda or Rwanda while the remaining fighters in the Congo surrendered. By ending the rebellion through military means rather than a negotiated solution, Kinshasa will now be able to dictate the terms of demobilizing fighters and dismantling the rebel group.
M23 was the latest incarnation of perennial uprisings by Congolese ethnic Tutsis in the Kivu provinces. In the initial stages of the conflict, insufficient Congolese military capability with little broader military support heavily constrained Kinshasa's ability to find a solution to the rebellion, forcing the government to negotiate with M23.
It was in fact the reintegration of the National Congress for the Defense of the People -- the previous incarnation of Tutsi rebel forces manifested through M23 -- into the Congolese military that led to the mutiny of several armed forces units in April 2012. The immediate cause of the M23 mutiny was Kinshasa's decision to remove former rebel leaders from command positions in Congolese army units in North Kivu.
These leaders had leveraged their political status, as well as riches gained through mineral racketeering and smuggling, to gain promotions. This caused friction between the Kinshasa government -- which had only so many positions to offer -- and the military leadership as well as political opposition groups.
This friction limited Kinshasa's ability to seek a negotiated settlement. While negotiations took place and at times looked very promising, Kinshasa was unable to offer the rebels and their leaders amnesty or a return to their positions in the Congolese military. Such a deal not only would have risked upsetting the internal balance between the government, the military and opposition parties, it also would have kept these groups in control of North Kivu, albeit under the banner of the Congolese army. Any dispute among the leadership had the potential to cause a rebellion. However, the ordinary foot soldiers of M23 posed a lesser risk, and could be integrated more effectively providing they were no longer under the command of their former leaders.
In the past, the Congolese military had never managed to end a rebellion by military means. Previous Tutsi rebel groups in eastern Congo outnumbered poorly armed and weakly supported Congolese forces. While the M23 group, with about 4,000 men at its highest point, was considerably smaller than groups in previous rebellions, it still posed a local humanitarian threat in an area that Congolese military forces have difficulty maneuvering in.
Several developments over the course of the conflict have increased the Congolese military's ability to tackle the rebels, the most notable of which was the deployment of the U.N. intervention brigade. This brigade force, made up of South African, Tanzanian and Malawian forces, has been actively engaged in offensive operations against M23.
In addition to carrying out several reorganizations to improve professionalism and eliminate corruption in the Kivu provinces, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been training two separate brigades since 2010 to deal specifically with rebels. Western military advisers have trained (and continue to train) several "commando battalions" within these brigades that have been actively engaged in the fighting against M23. Combined with other Congolese forces and backed by the U.N. intervention brigade, they were able to push M23 out of entrenched positions.
Waning Support
As the Congolese forces were strengthened by an influx of external support, the military component of the M23 rebel group was weakened by the withdrawal of support from Uganda and Rwanda as a result of increasing pressure from the international community. Several Western states cut aid to Rwanda, the most active backer of the rebels, and threatened to sever economic links.
The presence of the U.N. intervention brigade also increased the risk for states providing support to M23, which were reluctant to be seen as opposing a United Nations force. This support, which included weapons, vehicles and equipment as well as special operations forces, had given M23 a critical boost in its military capabilities.
For Uganda -- and particularly Rwanda, in the case of M23 -- the loss of a pliable rebel force limits the states' access to smuggled minerals from eastern Congo. More important, it minimizes their ability to deal with security concerns inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda is still worried about the continuing existence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, an ethnic Hutu militia that has sought refuge across the border since the overthrow of the Hutu Rwandan government that conducted the 1994 genocide. Uganda has similar security concerns relating to the Lord's Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces -- a Muslim militia that opposes the Ugandan government.
With M23 gone, Kinshasa will need to deal with these rebel groups as well to avoid intervention, either through incursions or by means of support for a local rebellion, by Uganda and Rwanda. Another option exists in which Kinshasa could allow Rwandan forces to operate alongside the Congolese military against opposing militias in Congolese territory. This arrangement has been successful in the past and could be a useful way to accommodate Rwanda's interests in a diplomatic fashion.
While negotiations with M23 concerning the fate of surrendered fighters continue, the final agreement has yet to be reached. Kinshasa is in a stronger position to deal with the situation than it has ever been before. The ability to end the M23 rebellion by force will also constrain the capacity of other former Tutsi rebel commanders to initiate rebellions.
Other armed groups, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and several Mai-Mai militias, continue to be active in the Kivu provinces, though they pose less of a local humanitarian threat than M23 did. Geographic constraints will, however, continue to limit Kinshasa's ability to directly control North and South Kivu. Security in this region will continue to be based on balancing the interests of local military leaders against the influences of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda.
Courtesy : Stratfor (www.stratfor.com)