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The US has some key decisions to make in the coming months with regards to Afghanistan which will indicate its strategy for the region, nature of its future intervention and the likely role Afghanistan’s neighbours and regional stakeholders may play in Afghanistan in the days ahead. The Obama administration is reportedly considering a new strategy post-2014 which is centered on a significantly reduced US military presence to undertake counter-terrorism operations against the Al Qaeda and train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
The transition to this new diplomatic strategy will be supplemented by economic and military aid and subject to reaching of a non-confrontational arrangement between the Kabul government and the Taliban leadership, promising a degree of peace and a will to work together. Washington would in addition look to continued support from ISAF/NATO partners and would seek greater political and financial support from Afghanistan’s neighbors — Pakistan, China, Iran, and regional stakeholders- Russia, India, Turkey and the CARs.
US had signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with Afghanistan on May 1, 2012, which envisions a U.S. commitment to Afghanistan beyond 2014. However the SPA has not resulted, so far, in a bilateral security pact or a status of forces agreement (SOFA) which would facilitate U.S military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014.
As rounds of negotiations continue between the US security establishment and the Afghan government on the SOFA, Karzai has been on record saying that the US wants to sign the SOFA within next three months. However, he see no reason to hurry and has linked the crucial issue of granting immunity to US troops operating in Afghanistan post-2014 within the SOFA, to the approval from the Loya jirga which he plans to hold by the end of this year. The Afghan-US bilateral security pact also figured during the recent visit by US senators to Kabul and their discussions with the Afghan President.
As Karzai continues to delay the signing of the SOFA and draw political mileage from it, US on its part has tried to play down and link between the SOFA and the number of troops it plans to base in Afghanistan. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey told the US House Armed Services Committee on 11 April 2013, that it isn’t necessary to have a decision on an exact number of troops in post-2014 Afghanistan before securing a bilateral security agreement. A range of 8,000 to 12,000 personnel to train, advise and assist ANSF has been indicated by the recent NATO agreements and therefore the effort to secure a bilateral support agreement can move forward based on these numbers.
Earlier, Gen Dempsey said in Stuttgart, Germany, while enroute to Kabul that he would like to see how Afghan forces perform this summer against the Taliban before determining the size of a residual U.S. force. Amongst other factors impinging the issue of US force size is the rate of improvement in the ANSF and their confidence to operate independently.
Karzai while interacting with the Afghan businessmen in Qatar in the last week of March 2013 said "The West, the Americans and Europeans - they're negotiating with us. After 2014, they will stay, they are not leaving. They want at least five bases in Afghanistan, from the north part of the country to the west. "As we negotiate with them, they [currently] have 150,000 troops. After 2014, there will be nearly 15,000 troops including from the US, NATO, France, Germany and up to ten countries.” This is an indication that besides training and advisory ISAF/NATO forces are likely to be in counter-terrorism posture post 2014.
While Karzai’s remarks gave the first indications of the likely SOFA with the US, they also point to a possible security arrangement being contemplated in Afghanistan post- 2014. The ISAF/NATO misadventure should have put to rest any plans of a multinational regional or UN security force in Afghanistan. With Pakistan and Iran resorting to providing safe havens and assistance to sectarian/ethnic militants in the guise of protecting national security interests, one solution would be to let Afghanistan’s neighbours manage their respective borders with Afghanistan. Pakistan would therefore have to deal with the situation (Taliban) it has created and China will have to contribute in security terms to safeguard and further its economic investments in Afghanistan. China would also have to factor-in the issue of Islamic militancy more tangibly and bilaterally in its engagement with Pakistan.
The US and its allies would hold bases in the North and West of the country to manage the border with Iran and the CARs. This would enable US to safeguard its interest not only in Afghanistan but also in the Caucasus and the Baltic region. It would be logistically independent of Pakistan as NDN would be secure. It would also provide an incentive to US partner countries such as Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania to remain committed in Afghanistan. The Russian concerns of terror and narcotics would be addressed and encourage stepping-up of its ongoing non-combat support to the ANSF. US presence in West Afghanistan would limit Iranian influence, maintain a threat to its nuclear ambitions and quell sectarian tensions in Afghanistan.
An indicator of possibility of such a security arrangement is the increasing focus of the recent US attacks on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in North Afghanistan. According to the Long War Journal, IMU is a key ally of al Qaeda and the Taliban, is known to fight alongside the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has been integrated into the Taliban's shadow government in northern Afghanistan. It has a long-term goal of establishing an Islamic State in Uzbekistan and the entire Central Asian region. The IMU it appears remains entrenched in northern Afghanistan despite years of operations against it.
ISAF has significantly increased its targeting of the IMU this year, in comparison to previous years. There have been 15 reported raids against the IMU in North Afghanistan by ISAF so far this year, as against six operations targeting the group in 2012. All 15 raids against the IMU have taken place in the northern provinces of Baghlan (4 raids), Jawzjan (1), Kunduz (6), and Takhar (4).This could be an indication that US security forces are seeking to dominate their future area of interest prior to the coming transition from a combat role to an advisory role.
For India such a scenario would present India an opportunity to build on its relations with Afghanistan and elements of the Northern Alliance, step up on its economic investments and cultural cooperation and possibly take its training assistance to the ANSF to next level. It would also create an environment where it leverage its good relations with the CARs.
By Special Arrangement with The Centre For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (http://www.claws.in)