As temperatures rise and a turbulent domestic polity makes apprehensive or anticipatory gestures to electoral imperatives, a bemused public is informed that India’s ‘feeble’ foreign policy has made her suddenly vulnerable to coercion...
indifference and generally negative relations with strong and weak neighbours alike. Inured though ‘the nation’ must be to such melodrama , there is a danger that major global developments , largely ignored by the current media narratives, might , in the not too distant future, have grave implications for the country’s security.
Coping or managing the not so peaceful rise of China will remain a given in foreign policy approaches of China’s neighbours for some time; India appears to have glimpsed some routes to deal with the issue as the resolution of the Ladakh issue makes clear. There is, however, another challenge emerging to our national interests which must, or at any rate should, be occupying the attention of the foreign policy establishment at the moment; the rapid deterioration of the situation to our West-beyond but including the frightening fragility of tormented Pakistan.
India’s vulnerability to instability in West Asia, particularly in the Gulf, has long been recognised; the six million or so expatriates in the region, their well-being and safety, and our dependence on the Gulf as the source of 2/3rds of our energy needs. Other less benign and more insidious influences, however, emanate from this region, in many cases beyond the control of States and their governments. As the Gulf gets entangled in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia escalates and becomes more rigid, it today reflects the growing sectarian divisions in the Arab world, a schism that is already devouring Pakistan and may inflict itself on us. There is yet another more dangerous consequence of the turmoil, the growth and assertiveness of violent religious extremism, that has emerged as perhaps the most serious threat from the region, as the violence that is wracking it spills over from Libya to Mali, across the Maghreb and Mashreq, and perhaps most tragically, from Sria through the Levant.
The people’s revolutions in much of the Arab world may have been primarily for democratic freedoms; one of the consequences has been, however, the affirmation of an Islamic identity somewhat on the lines of the Iranian revolution. Tunisia, where it all began, initially emerged with a moderate Islamic government, but it is today faced not just by an overthrow of a tolerant society by extreme Salafism, but by terrorism and violent extremism. Egypt’s society has become more polarised on sectarian and communal lines than before, and Salafis challenge any attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to accommodate the complexities of Egyptian society. Here, too, alleged militants associated with al Qaeda in the Maghreb have been active, mainly in the Sinai, but more recently, in Cairo itself. Libya is close to being a failed state with weapons and jihadis fanning out from Mali to Syria. The mayhem in Syria, that today is at the centre of global concern, involves a myriad offshoots of rebel opposition, from the Muslim Brothehood to al Nusra, affiliated with al Qaeda and the involvement of almost as many countries.
Mindful of the risk of sounding politically incorrect, one cannot but remark on the irony of the situation; Mubarak, Gaddafi and even Assad, sought to explain their dictatorial rule by citing the dangers from terrorists and extremists. Indeed, Mubarak had once remarked that but for the control exercised by the state which was criticized by his friends in the West, his region would become, as it has, “a nest of terrorists.”
Disentangling the threads knotted in the Syrian Crisis, and indeed, it is a crisis, is somewhat easier than trying to find the motivations-except at the most obvious level. In a sense, the consolidation of the opposition in Syria and the involvement of regional and international players began with the Muslim Brotherhood, exiled from Syria but based in Turkey, negotiating with the Assad Government for recognition and rehabilitation.
This was at a time Turkey, a NATO member, saw itself as a role model for the Arab countries emerging from dictatorship and was close to the Syrian Government. The failure of the negotiations and the launch of a crackdown on the opposition by Assad led to a spiral of violence, with Qatar and Saudi Arabia funding and arming the rebels thereby underlining a sectarian divide in the conflict. Emerging from this conflict, and attracting trained fighters from Afghanistan and Libya, extremist groups such as Jabhat al Nusra, which has announced its linkages with al Qaeda in Iraq have become the most effective face of the opposition, despite efforts by the Arab League and the US to stitch together a more moderate coalition.
For incomprehensible reasons, the UK and France have been trying to push the EU and the US towards a more proactive role against Assad, from proposing a no-fly zone (shades of Libya!) to pressuring the EU to withdraw its arms embargo on Syria to raising the issue of the use of chemical weapons by Assad’s Government. Into this tangle, Israel carried out two ill-advised air strikes to counter, it says, Hezbollah, whose fighters are already in Syria, drawing Lebanon into the fray- an action that has further divided the opposition, and ironically, possibly, strengthened Assad.
There are some glimmers of hope- an agreement between Russia and the US, backed by Lakhdar Brahimi ,the UN and Arab League Envoy, and the EU (despite Britain and France), to call an international conference by the end of May, using the Geneva Accords of last year as a foundation, calling for a political rather than a military solution. Egypt and Iran, in an unlikely meeting of minds, have proposed peace plans also based on a politically negotiated solution.
There is a general approval of such an approach, except for , and expectedly, opposition from the militant opposition in Syria who have vowed to keep fighting, and countries like Turkey, that have, in the face of contrary evidence, insisted that the Syrian Government has crossed what the US had declared a ‘red line’- the use of chemical weapons. The glimmer may turn out to be a mere blink of light, unless there is robust support for and in the international conference. The question arises, even if States can be brought around to accepting the political solution, who will control the armed extremist groups?
India has, in view of her major interests in stability in the region, been so far operating through the IBSA-when she with Brazil and South Africa, then all members of the Security Council had sent special envoys to Syria, and through BRICS, which at its last Summit reaffirmed its “opposition to any further militarization of the conflict” (in Syria). The BRICS also supported the Geneva Communique and the UN-Arab League envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi and called for a “Syrian- led political process” which would lead to a national dialogue, taking into account the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect for Syrian “independence, integrity and sovereignty”.
The time has come for a more active role, perhaps, through the forthcoming Summit of IBSA to be held in Delhi in early June. The three countries could offer to work with the UN-Arab League envoy and push for the early holding of the international conference agreed upon by the US and Russia. India’s bilateral relations also need to be brought into play: with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The rebel groups have been dependent for their funding and weapons on these states- and of course others, more covertly. The groups are, however, without countries, without roots and without loyalties that would bind them to any state and devoid of any real understanding of any religion; it is only by stopping the flow of funds and weapons that pressure can be brought to bear on them. India has been assiduously building up relationships with the countries of the Gulf, particularly with these three. It might be possible to synchronise such actions with the US and Russia to ensure the success of the conference, and the strengthening of the hands of Lakhdar Brahimi.
This is India’s neighbourhood on whose stability her wellbeing and security rests. It is imperative that unusual and innovative approaches are used to stem, not only the physical spill-over of violence and extremism, but the ideologies that are emanating the region.
Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, an eminent strategic analyst, is a former member of the Indian Foreign Service. She has served as India’s Ambassador to Egypt.